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When Daddy Doesn't Want to Be Daddy Anymore: 
An Argument Against Paternity Fraud Claims 
Melanie B. Jacobs t 
INTRODUCTION 
For wrongly convicted felons, improved DNA testing has increasingly 
provided the means by which innocence is proved and freedom from 
incarceration secured. A recent study of 328 criminal cases and subsequent 
exonerations over the past fifteen years found that DNA evidence contributed 
to 145 of those exonerations, and, moreover, that DNA evidence helped free 
inmates in 88 percent of the rape cases in the study. I Former Governor Ryan of 
lllinois made national headlines when he commuted the death penalty sentences 
of 167 inmates because new evidence revealed that many on death row were 
innocent of the crimes for which they were convicted.2 DNA testing has 
applicability well beyond criminal law, however. Improved genetic testing3 is 
changing how we define "traditional" families. While res judicata and estoppel 
principles have long been used to preserve the unitary, nuclear family, some 
states are moving away from these doctrines in favor of biological paternal 
certainty.4 Thus, if a man is not the biological father of a child-and was either 
uncertain or unaware of this biological fact-he may petition to "disestablish" 
t Assistant Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. Many thanks to David Favre, 
Theresa Glennon, Jane MUll'hy, and Nancy Knauer for their thoughtful suggestions. 
\. Adam Liptak, Study Suspects Thousands of False Convictions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,2004, at 
A15. 
2. See, e.g., CBS News, Ryan Clearing Illinois Death Row tJan. 11, 2003), at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/12130/nationaVmain534639.shtml. 
3. See Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of 
Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 547, 555-56 (2000) (explaining that by the 1980s, DNA or "genetic 
marker" testing provided probabilities of paternity greater than 99%); see also D. KELLY WEISBERG & 
SUSAN FRELlCH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAw 510 (2d ed. 2002) (describing both human leukocyte 
antigen (HLA) and modern genetic marker testing and their respective accuracy in establishing 
percentage probability of biological paternity). 
4. See infra Part IV. 
Copyright <C 2004 by the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 
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paternity. 5 These disestablishment petitions represent the emergence of a new 
family law phenomenon-paternity fraud. 6 
Many men who have either been adjudicated fathers or who have 
voluntarily acknowledged their paternal legal status7 are now challenging the 
propriety of those legal determinations because genetic testing subsequently 
revealed their nonpaternity.s A grassroots movement is underway to exonerate 
these innocent fathers from the "bonds of parentage.,,9 Likening newly 
discovered evidence of nonpaternity to DNA testing that exonerates a felon, the 
U.S. Citizens Against Paternity Fraud website includes the motto, "If the Genes 
don't fit, you must acquit."JO 
Responding to growing concerns from men who no longer wish to pay 
child support for their nonbiological children, a growing number of states, by 
case or statute, permit men to disestablish paternity if they successfully offer 
5. Id. 
6. Paternity fraud is now a part of the American vernacular, used by both lawmakers and 
laypersons alike to describe the situation in which a man who believes he is the biological father of a 
child and therefore functions as a parent, later learns that he has no biological connection to the child 
and seeks to disestablish paternity because of alleged "fraud." A quick .Internet search reveals a 
multitude of websites devoted to the issue of paternity fraud, and numerous newspaper and magazine 
articles have been written about this growing phenomenon, several of which are cited herein. 
As used in this paper, paternity fraud refers to actions to disestablish paternity by an alleged 
nonbiological father. This article does not address cases in which paternity fraud has been an alleged 
cause of action in an interspousal tort case. See, e.g., Day v. Heller, 653 N.W.2d 475 (Neb. 2002) 
(rejecting claims of fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress brought by a man against his 
ex-wife based on her misrepresentation that he was child's biological father). 
7. See infra note 96 and accompanying text regarding voluntary acknowledgments of paternity. 
8. In Pennsylvania, two years after divorcing his wife, Gerald Miscovich became suspicious that 
his four-year-old son was not his biological child and took the child for genetic testing. Miscovich v. 
Miscovich, 688 A.2d 726, 727 (1997). The testing confinned Gerald's suspicion and he subsequently 
petitioned the court to admit the DNA testing to disestablish his paternity and to terminate his child 
support obligation. !d. Relying upon the marital presumption of paternity, the court denied his request. 
Id. at 732. Moreover, the court characterized his attempts to disestablish paternity as "disgusting." The 
court wrote: 
We recognize that there is something disgusting about a husband who, moved by bitterness 
toward his wife, suddenly questions the legitimacy of her child whom he had been accepting 
and recognizing as his own .... Where the husband has accepted his wife's child and held it 
out as his own over a period of time, he is estopped from denying paternity. 
Id. (quoting Commonwealth ex reI. Goldman v. Goldman, 184 A.2d 351,355 (1962». Miscovich is a 
paternity fraud legislation activist. But see infra notes 171-179 and accompanying text concerning a 
recent Pennsylvania decision that embraced the doctrine of paternity fraud and pennitted an ex-husband 
to disestablish his paternity. 
9. See, e.g., U.S. Citizens Against Paternity Fraud, at http://www.paternityfraud.com (last visited 
October 29, 2004). Carnell Smith, the founder of the organization and website, attempted several times 
to vacate his paternity judgment and support obligation in the State of Georgia. Men's News Daily 
Newswire, Paternity Fraud Legislation Sweeps the Nation (Apr. 30, 2003), at 
http://mensnewsdaily.comlarchive!newswire!nw03/nmdlnewswire043003.htm. He became a lobbyist 
for paternity fraud refonn and after Georgia recently passed its paternity fraud bill, Mr. Smith returned 
to court and had his child support obligation vacated. Id. Mr. Smith describes himself and his efforts as 
follows: "Carnell Smith is a married Christian, paternity fraud victim, DNA poster boy, non-custodial 
dad and self-avowed advocate for legislative refonn to help children know their biological father and 
restore constitutional rights to fraud victims. I am looking for victims and supporters-worldwide!" 
Carnell's Case, at http://www.man4justice.coml0418cas.htm (last visited October 29, 2004). 
10. U.S. Citizens Against Paternity Fraud, at http://www.paternityfraud.com (last visited October 
29,2004). 
HeinOnline -- 16 Yale J.L. &. Feminism 195 2004
2004] When Daddy Doesn't Want to Be Daddy Anymore 195 
scientific proof-i.e., DNA test results-that demonstrate a genetic 
impossibility of paternity. I I The issue of paternity disestablishment has 
become a cause celebre for men who have unsuccessfully petitioned to 
disestablish their paternity subsequent to genetic testing which disproved their 
biological fatherhood. For instance, Patrick McCarthy learned after his divorce 
that his fourteen-year-old daughter was not biologically his. Although he tried 
to terminate his paternity and child support obligation, he was unsuccessful. I2 
He has instead become a leading activist in the battle for "paternity fraud 
reform" and has founded New Jersey Citizens Against Paternity Fraud, an 
organization that recently paid $50,000 for nine billboards along highways that 
show a pregnant woman and read "Is It Yours? If Not, You Still Have to 
Pay!,,13 
Nonbiological fathers like McCarthy compare their nonpaternity with a 
wrongful criminal conviction. As Mary Anderlik and Mark Rothstein have 
recently observed, "[T]hose within the fathers' rights movement ... tend to 
view family law through the lens of criminal law .... It is common to find the 
issue framed as one of justice or fairness, in the sense that evidence admissible 
to 'convict' should also be available to 'exonerate.",14 But can-and should-
family law be equated with criminal law? A wrongly convicted man should be 
exonerated: he has been the victim of "the system." The analogy to a 
"wrongly" identified father is much more difficult to make: once a man has 
assumed all of the functions and responsibilities of parenthood, he is-in a v-ery 
meaningful way-the child's father. A man who learns years after his child's 
birth that he has no biological connection to his childl5 may feel wrongly 
adjudicated and tricked by the mother of the child-a very natural reaction. He 
may further believe that he has been the victim of a federal and state system 
that forces mothers to name their baby's father in order to qualify for certain 
fmancial benefits. 16 I do not mean to ignore the emotional devastation this 
nonbiological father experiences after learning he is not the genetic father of his 
child. To simply disestablish paternity, however, ignores the crucial difference 
II. See. e.g., MD. FAMILY § 5-1038 (1995) (authorizing the set aside of a paternity judgment if 
blood or genetic testing excludes as the biological father the individual names as the father in the 
judgment); OHIO STAT. §§ 3119.961 - 3119.962 (2002) (permitting the disestablishment of paternity 
based upon blood or genetic tests which exclude biological paternity). See infra Section IV.B for an 
analysis of these and other paternity fraud statutes. 
12. Kathy Boccella, Men Seek 'Paternity Fraud' Law, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 23,2002, at AI. 
13. Id. 
14. Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, DNA-Based Identity Testing and the Future of the 
Family: A Research Agenda, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 215,220 (2001). 
15. Throughout this Article, I use the pronoun "his" in reference to the child who is legally, yet not 
biologically, that of the father. I have purposefully chosen to identifY the child as "his child" because in 
many of the cases discussed herein, the father had established a functional parent-child relationship. 
Moreover, even in those cases in which a significant emotional relationship has not been established, a 
significant legal relationship has been established, which may be just as important to the child. 
16. See infra Section l.A discussing the link between the child support enforcement process and 
erroneous paternity establishment. 
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between the criminal and family law contexts: the presence and best interests of 
a child. 
At the outset, it is necessary to explore the very term, "paternity fraud." 
Though used by courts, legislatures, newspersons, and others, at its core the 
tenn embraces an often-incorrect assumption: a devious and fraudulent act by 
the child's mother. In paternity fraud cases, the legal father typically portrays 
the mother as a scheming Jezebel who set out to trick, dupe, and deceive the 
man she falsely named as the child's father. And many people reading articles 
about "duped dads" feel sympathy for a man who was so wronged. But the 
scheming lezebel scenario, as the case discussions herein will show, is not 
always true. A pregnant woman having an extramarital affair, for instance, 
may not know which man is the biological father. If her marriage is back. on 
track, she may not wish to rock the boat and damage her family further by 
revealing the affair. In the paternity context, some women may not know 
which man is the biological father of their child but must name a man in order 
to qualify for governmental benefits. 17 The issue is much more complicated 
than a bad girl, good guy scenario. 
Some women have purposely lied to their husbands or boyfriends. But the 
focus on a conniving woman who victimizes a man is misplaced. Paternity 
fraud claims, at their most base and essential level, involve a child or children, 
and these claims do children a great disservice. Paternity fraud statutes-
predicated on the enhanced availability and reliability of genetic testing18-are 
being used to destroy established, and often times functional, parent-child 
relationships. Simply because we have the means to determine biological 
parentage with greater certainty does not mean that it is in the best interests of 
children to do SO.19 Courts and legislatures express disagreement concerning 
what exactly is in a child's best interests: preservation of an existing parent-
child relationship or severing that relationship in hopes of establishing the 
actual biological father as the legal father. This Article presumes that it is in 
the child's best interests to hold legal fathers responsible. As Professor 
Elizabeth Bartholet has recently written, "We should feel free to hold men 
responsible regardless of whether they were in some way misled .into 
parenthood by women. Children should not be penalized in a way that denies 
17. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text. 
18. As discussed above, paternity can be established with biological certainty, based on improved 
blood and genetic testing. Moreover, testing can be easily accomplished-now even home testing kits 
are available--and the tests are relatively inexpensive. See, e.g., Mary R. Anderlik, Assessing the 
Quality of DNA-Based Parentage Testing: Findings From a Survey of Laboratories, 43 JURIMETRlCS J. 
291 (2003) (discussing the availability of home testing and other methods of parentage testing in 
assessing the need for parentage testing reform that better regulates both laboratory practices and who 
and when parties may undergo parentage testing). 
19. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 323, 
324 (2004) ("Once a child-parent relationship has been created, we should not let it be destroyed simply 
because there is no DNA match. Parenting, once undertaken, is or should be a lifetime responsibility."). 
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them fundamental nurturing and support because of the actions of their 
mothers.,,20 
Advances in paternity testing causes us to re-examine the legal and policy 
justifications for redefining families. The structure of the American family has 
undergone dramatic change in recent years and the numbers of traditional 
nuclear families are in decline while single-parent families and step families are 
growing.21 In an era in which individuals and couples, heterosexual and 
homosexual, are embracing new reproductive technologies to create families, 
the "biological connection" often does not assist in establishing legal parentage 
for "intended" parents.22 Couples and individuals alike may contract with 
sperm donors, egg donors, and/or gestational surrogates to create families. 23 As 
a result, reliance on biology as the sole means by which to determine legal 
parentage no longer makes sense?4 Functional parenthood-emphasizing the 
daily, routine, and even mundane aspects of everyday parenting-provides a 
more realistic approach to defining legal parentage, especially for 
nontraditional families. 25 
20. !d. at 340. 
21. According to U.S. Census Bureau 2000 statistics, married-couple households with children 
made up only 24 percent of all households compared with 40 percent in 1970. JASON FIELDS & LYNNE 
M. CASPER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS 3 (2001), 
available at ht\p:llwww.census.gov/prodl200Ipubs/p20-537.pdf. 
22. For example, the Uniform Parentage Act now provides a methodology by which legal parentage 
can be established for children born using anonymous sperm or egg donation and/or gestational 
surrogates. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 7 & 8, 9B U.1.A. 354-70 (2000). 
23. See, e.g., Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a 
couple who had arranged for the birth of a child through donor insemination and a surrogate mother 
were in fact the child's legal parents, despite the absence of any biological connection to the child, 
because the child would not have been born ''but for the efforts of the intended parents") (quoting 
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776,782 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993». 
24. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, From Genes, Marriage and Money to Nurture: Redefining 
Fatherhood, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S 1.J. 132,134 (2003) ("Genes should not define fatherhood. This is 
wrong for men and wrong for children. Genes define identity, but that link should be separated from the 
obligations and rights of parenthood.'); Bartholet, supra note 19, at 323 
Id. 
[B]iology has never been all-determinative in defining parentage, whether in nature or under 
law .... For as long as law has governed various family matters among humans, it has 
looked at biology as only one among a number of factors to be used in deciding how to 
allocate parental rights and responsibilities. 
25. Scholars have been addressing the need for expanded definitions of parenthood (i.e., beyond 
biology) for two decades. In her seminal 1984 article, Katharine Bartlett argued that courts must look 
beyond the traditional exclusivity model of parentage, in light of the decline of the nuclear family. 
Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives 
When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. 1. REv. 879 (1984). Nancy Polikoffhas 
also argued that legal parenthood premised only upon biology leaves many children with nontraditional 
parents out in the cold. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood 
to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.1. 459 
(1990); see also Janet Leach Richards, Redefining Parenthood: Parental Rights Versus Child Rights, 40 
WAYNE 1. REv. 1227 (1994) (recognizing the need to include nonbiological caretakers within the legal 
definition of parent based upon the best interests of the child); Richard Storrow, Parenthood by Pure 
Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS 1.J. 597 
(2002)(arguing that family law jurisprudence must expand beyond traditional notions of marriage and 
biology and should embrace functional parenthood). 
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In addressing the issue of paternity fraud claims, this Article endeavors to 
reconcile two competing theoretical trends in family law: biology versus 
functionality. As discussed herein, many courts and scholars embrace 
functionality in the context of establishing parental relationships yet place 
emphasis on biology in disestablishing parental relationships. While the 
differences between seeking to establish a child-parent relationship and 
disestablishing such a relationship are noted and discussed, they are 
nonetheless synthesized to encourage one family law model, rather than two. 
This Article offers readers a fresh perspective not only regarding paternity 
fraud claims but modem family law generally, by seeking middle-ground 
between the legal foci of biology and functionality. My proposal for resolving 
paternity fraud claims involves a balancing between the competing interes!s of 
a legal, yet nonbiological father, and his child. 
Specifically, this Article explores the disconnect between two concurrent 
legal trends: first, establishing parenthood and parental rights based on 
principles of functionality; and second, disestablishing legal parenthood 
because of a lack of biological connection between parent and child. In Part I, I 
discuss the underlying causes of the paternity fraud phenomenon, including the 
influences of enhanced genetic testing and improved child support 
enforcement. In Part II, I review the traditional establishment of parentage and 
the increasing recognition of legal rights for functional parents. In Part III, I 
discuss the disestablishment of paternity, focusing primarily on cases which 
rely on principles of res judicata, estoppel, and finality of judgments to 
preclude paternity disestablishment and discuss why it has historically been 
difficult for men to challenge paternity in a range of contexts. Next, in Part IV, 
I review several recent cases and statutes that permit disestablishment of 
paternity in "fundamental fairness" to the nonbiological father. Finally, in Part 
V, I offer a proposed statute of limitations for paternity fraud actions which 
strikes a balance between the best interests of children in preserving intact 
father-child relationships while permitting nonbiological fathers a short 
window in which to challenge a seemingly unfair paternity establishment. I 
conclude that permitting disestablishment of paternity without a reason:!ble 
statute of limitations does not serve the best interests of children and is 
damaging to the children involved as well as our society's emerging notions of 
family. 
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I. THE PA TERNI1Y FRAUD PHENOMENON 
A. How Increased Emphasis on Child Support Enforcement Has Influenced 
the Paternity Fraud Debate 
Paternity fraud cases arise in several different contexts: 1) husbands 
seeking to disestablish paternity at the time of divorce; 2) ex-husbands seeking 
to disestablish paternity subsequent to a divorce; and 3) urunarried fathers 
seeking to disestablish paternity subsequent to a paternity judgment or legal 
acknowledgment of parentage?6 The circumstances leading to their respective 
paternity establishments are different but their concerns about paternity fraud 
are similar: they have no genetic relationship to the child they believed was 
their biological offspring and thus they no longer wish to be legally obligated to 
pay child support?7 
Particular to paternity cases, however, is the role of federal and state child 
support establishment and enforcement programs. The federal Office of Child 
Support Enforcement (OCSE) was established in 1975 as part of an amendment 
to the Social Security Act of 1975?S Under the Act, each state was required to 
develop its own child support enforcement program, although the law clearly 
envisioned a cooperative effort between states and the federal government and 
states receive some federal funding for these programs. Although states have 
discretion to operate their programs, federal law imposes certain requirements29 
and Congress has passed several laws relating to the federal child support 
enforcement program. 3D For example, the Family Support Act of 1988 (FSA) 
set performance standards for state programs establishing paternity and states 
26. There is a large body of scholarship and case law addressing the ability of husbands to 
challenge paternity of a child born in wedlock at the time of divorce, i.e., the "marital presumption." In 
attempting to refine the focus of this article and avoid the many complicated legal and policy issues 
specific to the marital presumption, I have narrowed my analysis to the situations in which a man 
challenges his paternity subsequent to a divorce or paternity judgment and do not discuss situations in 
which a man challenges paternity during a divorce proceeding. For more information about challenging 
the marital presumption of paternity at the time of divorce, see, for example, Glennon, supra note 3 
(providing a thorough background of the marital presumption, the competing policy concerns both for 
and against continued vitality of the marital presumption, and treatment of the marital presumption in 
the Uniform Parentage Act); and Diane S. Kaplan, Why Truth is Not a Defense in Paternity Actions, 10 
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 69 (2000) (examining three state models of the marital presumption). 
27. Murray Davis, a "duped dad" from Michigan, is another paternity fraud activist. As he 
explained in an interview, "Why should we continue to pursue, incarcerate or hold in financial bondage 
an individual who can prove his innocence via irrefutable evidence? Men are just kind of tired of being 
victimized." Robert E. Pierre, States Consider Laws Against Paternity Fraud, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 
2002, at A03. 
28. IRA MARK ELLMANET AL., FAMILY LAW, CASES, TEXT AND PROBLEMS, 576 (3d ed. 1999). 
29. Id. 
30. See generally Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support 
Enforcement, and Fatherless Children (2003) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the International 
Society of Family Law North American Conference in Eugene, Oregon) (on file with author). 
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must meet a specified "paternity establishment percentage.,,31 In addition, the 
FSA incorporated additional requirements for state programs, such as income 
withholding from noncustodial parents' wages, presumptive support guidelines 
for setting child support awards, periodic review and adjustment of some 
orders, and the development of statewide automated systems.32 
Within the debate concerning paternity fraud, some men may feel 
victimized by a paternity and child support enforcement regime that has as its 
core mission the increased collection of child support, much of which is 
predicated upon first establishing a paternity order. In fiscal year 2003, the 
OCSE reports that preliminary data reveals paternity was established or 
acknowledged for more than 1.5 million children.33 As the Maryland Court of 
Appeals noted in its decision in Langston v. RifJe-a case in which a 
nonbiological father had his paternity disestablished34---our current system of 
paternity and support establishment and enforcement may be flawed. The court 
wrote, 
In the great majority of these cases, it is the State, on behalf of the 
mother, who initiates the proceeding against the putative father .... 
[and] through its various agencies, litigates the matter to 
conclusion. . . . [F]athers often may not be present to challenge the 
proceeding or to provide a blood or genetic sample.35 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has also discussed the role of 
state agencies in establishing patemitl6 and wrote that it "recognize[ d] the 
anomaly of enforcing the parental obligations of a man who was identified as a 
parent only (it seems) because the State insisted that the mother name [a 
child's] biological father, where he has now established that he is not that 
man.,,37 Further addressing the state's role in paternity establishment, the court 
wrote: 
Where the State requires an unmarried woman to name her child's 
putative father, the department should require that the parties submit to 
genetic testing prior to the execution of any acknowledgment of 
paternity or child support agreement. To do otherwise places at risk 
the well-being of children born out of wedlock whose fathers 
31. APPLETON & WEISBERG, supra note 3, at 506-07 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 652(g) (1994 & Supp. 
1999)). 
32. ELLMAN, supra note 28, at 576 n.15. 
33. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN REsOURCES OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, FACT SHEET FOR 
THE OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT (2004), available at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/opalfact_sheets/csejactsheet.html(last visited Sept. 27,2004). 
34. 754 A.2d 389 (Md. Ct. App. 2000). 
35. Id. at 409. 
36. In Re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488 (Mass. 2001) (holding that man who had genetic 
evidence disproving paternity could not vacate a paternity judgment entered more than five years 
earlier). 
37. Id. at 499. 
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subsequently learn, as modern scientific methods now make possible, 
that they have no genetic link to their children.38 
201 
Genetic testing prior to acknowledging paternity should be considered as a 
process norm to avoid later challenges to paternity.39 If testing reveals 
nonpaternity, the man will exercise his choice to either deny paternity or to 
voluntarily accept the legal responsibility of parentage that he could not later 
deny. 40 However, men who do not undergo genetic testing prior to 
acknowledging paternity-because they do not wish to, believe that they are 
the biological father without testing, and the like-should not later be able to 
deny their paternity because they no longer wish to act as parents. Other 
parents cannot choose a date on which they no longer wish to support-
emotionally and financially-their child. Why should these nonbiological yet 
functional parents be permitted to vacate their parental obligations? 
It is estimated that, in 1999, almost one-third of 280,000 paternity cases 
evaluated by the American Association of Blood Banks excluded the individual 
tested as the biological father of the child.41 By extension, it is quite plausible 
that a significant number of the men who voluntarily acknowledge paternity 
during a divorce proceeding, by written document, or who are adjudicated legal 
fathers without the benefit of genetic testing are not actually the biological 
father of their child. But is disestablishment of paternity, often many years 
after entry of a paternity judgment, an appropriate method of redress? Paternity 
fraud jurisprudence has at its core the difficulty of balancing competing best 
interests: those of the child and the child's nonbiological yet legal famer. 
Whose rights are paramount? Whose should be paramount? And can we 
characterize this issue as one of "genetic innocence"? 
B. An Introduction to the Biological Versus Functional Parenthood Debate 
As our societal understanding of "family" grows, changes, and moves 
away from the traditional, nuclear family, an interesting disconnect has 
emerged. As newspaper columnist Ellen Goodman has observed, these 
scientific advances force us to ask, "What does make a father? Diapers or 
38. Id. at 499 n.21. 
39. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent-Child Relationship 
in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1066-70 (2003) (proposing 
mandatory paternity testing of all children at birth to estop patemitychallenges). 
40. Carbone and Cahn suggest that if subsequent to genetic testing which reveals lack ofbiologicaI 
paternity a nonbiological father signs a voluntary acknowledgment he may not, under any 
circumstances, challenge the acknowledgment. Id. 
41. See Betty L.W. v. William E.W., 569 S.E.2d 77, 88 CVV. Va. 2002) (Maynard, J., dissenting). In 
her article assessing the quality of DNA-based parentage testing, Mary R. Anderlik writes that the 
American Association of Blood Banks Annual Report Summary for 2000 reveals an overall exclusion 
rate of 27.9% for domestic accredited laboratories. See Anderlik, supra note 18, at 295; PARENTAGE 
TESTING STANDARDS COMM., AM. ASS'N OF BLOOD BANKS ANNUAL REpORT SUMMARY FOR 2000, at 3 
(2001 ). 
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DNA?,,42 She continues, "[F]amily law seems to be going in two directions at 
once. Weare giving more recognition to non-biological relationships .... 
[a]nd more weight to DNA.,,43 In recent years, scholars, judges, and legislators 
have begun to recognize the importance of functional parenthood. For 
example, several states have permitted nonbiological lesbian coparents to 
maintain visitation and custody petitions because of their intent to parent and 
their history of parenting.44 Similarly, other nonbiological parents such as 
stepparents, grandparents, and foster parents have been able to maintain greater 
access to the children they have helped to raise.45 Thus, biology is not the sole 
criterion for determining parent-child relationships. Moreover, it should not be 
the decisive criterion for determining such relationships. As one judge has 
noted, "A father-child relationship encompasses more (and greater) 
considerations than a determination of whose genes the child cariies. 
Sociological and psychological components should be considered. The laws 
governing adoptions have acknowledged that parentage is comprised of a 
totality of factors, the least significant of which is genetics.,,46 
What determines parentage has been the subject of much scholarship; 
whether primacy should be placed on a genetic relationship or a functional one 
is the subject of much debate. While there is greater ease in favoring 
traditional principles of biological parentage and presumptions of nuclear 
families, many scholars are now embracing nontraditional definitions of 
parentage and family.47 It is interesting to note, for example, that both the 
American Law Institute (ALI) and the 2002 revised version of the Uniform 
Parentage Act (UP A) recognize the fact that parental status and legal 
parenthood may be established without regard to biological connection.48 
42. Ellen Goodman, What Makes A Father? BALT. SUN, May 1,2001, at IIA. 
43. /d. 
44. See, e.g., Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000) (holding that fonner nonbiological 
lesbian mother could bring action for visitation with child she had helped to raise); V.c. v. M.lB., 748 
A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) (same); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999) (same). 
45. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. 
46. Hulett v. Hulett, 544 N.E.2d 257, 263 (Brown, J., concurring). 
47. See, e.g., supra note 25. 
48. The ALI Principles include establishment of a legal parent child relationship without regard to 
genetic connection in a variety of circumstances. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text. 
Moreover, the UP A also includes presumptions oflegal parenthood that are not predicated on biology. 
For example, the UPA presumes a man's legal fatherhood if "for the first two years of the child's life, he 
resided in the same household with the child and openly held out the child as his own." UNIF. 
PARENTAGE Acr § 204 (a)(5), 9B U.L.A. 14 (Supp. 2002). In fact, the UPA 2000 had originally 
eliminated this presumption but it was put back in with the 2002 amendments. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 
204 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 14 (Supp. 2002). By including this presumption of paternity, the UPA drafters 
make certain that legal parenthood can be established for nonbiological fathers. Moreover, UP A § 204 
further states that presumptions may only be rebutted pursuant to the procedures of Article 6, which 
allows courts to use estoppel principles to deny requests for genetic testing "in the interests of preserving 
a child's ties to the presumed or acknowledged father who openly held himself out as the child's father 
regardless of whether he is in fact the genetic father." [d. 
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While many courts are confronting the complexity of establishing 
parenthood for nonbiological parents and recognizing legal mechanisms for 
such establishment, they are similarly being confronted by men with proof of 
nonpaternity who are requesting disestablishment of paternity. These two 
trends are happening coterminously and demonstrate a nearly schizophrenic 
approach to defining legal parenthood. Within the particular context of 
paternity fraud, the same disconnect between genetic and functional parenthood 
emerges. Despite scientific advances and biological certainty of nonparentage, 
several courts have denied petitions to disestablish paternity because of the 
effect of that action on the child.49 These courts value the parent-child 
relationship as something more than shared DNA and have determined that the 
continued parent-child relationship remains in the child's best interests. 
At the other end of the spectrum, a number of courts and legislatures have 
established procedures whereby a legally established father can disestablish 
paternity if he has scientific proof. 50 These opinions and statutes suggest that 
either 1) the best interest of the child has no place in the parental 
disestablishment determination (thereby obviating the need to discuss whether 
dismantling an intact parent-child relationship is harmful to the child),51 or 2) 
the best interest of the child is knowing her or his biological father.52 While it 
is true that courts do not consider the best interests of the child in initial 
paternity determinations, it is wrong to suggest that the best interests of the 
child do not matter when disestablishing the legal parentage of a man the child 
has always considered her or his father. Moreover, while there are compelling 
reasons for a child to know her or his genetic identity, that knowledge does not 
mean that it is in the child's best interests to have an intact parent-child 
49. E.g., In re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488 (Mass. 2001) (because the father had actively 
pursued his parental relationship with his nonbiological daughter, he could not seek to disestablish his 
paternity more than five years after the entry of a paternity judgment). See infra Section IILB for 
detailed discussion of Cheryl and additional cases in which requests to disestablish paternity are 
rejected. 
50. E.g., Langston v. Riffe, 754 A.2d 389 (Md. Ct. App. 2000) (The Maryland Court of Appeals 
heard three appeals concerning disestablishment of paternity based upon genetic testing which 
conclusively established nonpaternity. The court, adhering to a Maryland statute permitting an action to 
disestablish paternity upon a showing of genetic nonpaternity, permitted each plaintiff, including a man 
who filed his action for nonpaternity nine years after entry of the paternity judgment, to disestablish his 
paternity). See infra Section N.A for a discussion of Langston and additional cases and statutes 
permitting paternity disestablishment. 
51. Langston, 754 A.2d at 431-32 (Court specifically stated that the best interests analysis applies 
only to matters related to paternity such as custody and visitation but is inapplicable to the paternity 
determination itself). 
52. E.g., Williams v. Williams, 843 So.2d 720, 723 (Miss. 2003). The Williams court rationalized 
that knowledge of genetic identity was in the child's best interests, even though no one knew who the 
biological father was and there was nothing to suggest a new parent-child relationship would be formed. 
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relationship terminated in the mere hopes of establishing a new one predicated 
b· I 53 on 100GY. 
In attempting to bring two disparate trends together-functionality versus 
biology-this Article seeks to strike a balance between the best interests of the 
child, i.e., preservation of an intact parent-child relationship, and the best 
interests of the nonbiological father, i.e., disestablishing paternity. Because the 
UPA and ALI often use a two-year time frame in which to establish certain 
parental presumptions, this Article uses the same two-year window as part of 
the mechanism by which to undo parental presumptions, and includes a best 
interests of the child component. The two-year window is seemingly arbitrary; 
why not use eighteen months or three years? The purpose for which this 
Article employs the two-year statute is to bring the jurisprudence of paternity 
fraud in line with emerging functionality jurisprudence. By so doing, this 
Article endeavors to recognize one holistic family law model and seeks to unite 
these disparate trends. Moreover, by adding a best interests of the child 
component, long-term, functional parent-child relationships are protected while 
only short-term, less involved parent-child relationships are subject to 
disestablishment. This, too, comports with the way in which courts are 
applying parent by estoppel and de facto parent principles to recognize the 
parental rights of nonbiological parents. 
Thus, the alleged nonbiological father should have a limited time in which 
to challenge his paternity: specifically, either 1) two years from the date on 
which a presumption of paternity, as defined by the UPA,54 applies to create a 
legal parental relationship, or 2) two years from the date on which a legal 
53. As Professor Dowd argues, "Genes should not be the foundation on which legal fatherhood is 
established." Rather, she suggests, genetic ties should create identity rights, for medical, health, and 
cultural reasons. Dowd, supra note 24, at 138-39. 
54. The Uniform Parentage Act § 204, 9B U.L.A. 14 (2002), provides that: 
(a) A man is presumed to be the father of a child if: 
(I) he and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child is born during 
the marriage; 
(2) he and the mother of the child were married to each other and the child is born 
within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, declaration of 
invalidity, or divorce .. : ; 
(3) before the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child married each other in 
apparent compliance with the law, even if the attempted marriage is or could be 
declared invalid, and the child is born during the invalid marriage or vvithin 300 days 
after its termination by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce ... ; 
(4) after the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child married each other in 
apparent compliance with the law, whether or not the marriage is or could be declared 
invalid, and he voluntarily asserted his paternity of the child, and: 
(A) the assertion is in a record filed with [state agency maintaining birth records); 
(B) he agreed to be and is named as the child's father on the child's birth 
certificate; or 
(C) he promised in a record to support the child as his own; or 
(5) for the first two years of the child's life, he resided in the same household with the 
child and openly held out the child as his own. 
(b) A presumption of paternity established under this section may be rebutted only by an 
adjudication under [Article) 6. 
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paternity judgment is established in the absence of genetic marker or blood 
testing and only if it is in the child's best interest.55 A short time period in 
which to challenge paternity largely protects the emotional and financial 
attachments children make with their fathers, while still providing duped dads 
the opportunity to undo the parent-child relationship before it progresses. 
Children are the victims of paternity fraud laws, which put them at risk of being 
rendered fatherless. These children need their interests protected more than 
nonbiological fathers who had opportunities to challenge their paternity prior to 
paternity adjudications. Additionally, this proposal, once adopted, will put men 
on notice that if they have any doubts about their relationship to a child, they 
should question paternity early on, rather than foster and nurture a parent-child 
relationship and years later seek to have it undone. 
Finally, critics may respond that some men do not nurture a relationship 
with their child and are merely legally adjudicated as fathers and then forced to 
pay child support. It is true that some men do not have a significant emotional 
bond with the child for whom they have been deemed legally responsible. As a 
policy matter and to best protect the most children, however, these men should 
be held accountable. Striking the appropriate balance in paternity fraud cases is 
not simple; as noted, the man involved has been lied to and will now be 
required to maintain a legal and fmancial obligation to a child who is not 
biologically his. In attempting to reconcile family law trends and to protect 
children who do have significant emotional attachments to their parents, I argue 
that the balance must be struck in favor of the children. 
Advocates of paternity fraud laws often argue that the man may not have 
any functional or emotional relationship with the child. Most often, those 
situations arise from paternity judgments where the legal father has not lived 
with the child nor functioned as a father. However, a man who is a defendant 
in a paternity action has the legal right to request a genetic test. If the man 
forgoes the testing and/or evades the legal process, it is unfair to the child that 
he should be able to avail himself of testing and the process years later. By 
then, the child has already benefited from the legal and financial aspects of the 
relationship, even if the emotional aspects are not involved. And, if for some 
reason a default judgment has been entered, my proposal still gives the 
nonbiological father two years in which to contest the paternity judgment. A 
man who does not challenge his paternity should thus be estopped from seeking 
to disestablish paternity after a significant period of time has passed. And, in 
the divorce context, a man who has lived with his child, functioned as a father, 
and established an emotional bond is every bit as much a parent as a man who 
is biologically related to his child. To ignore functional parenting in the 
paternity fraud context would cause too great an imbalance in family law 
generally. 
55. See infra Part V for a detailed analysis of my proposed statute of limitations. 
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II. TRADITIONAL ESTABLISHMENT OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF FuNCTIONAL PARENTHOOD 
A. Traditional Bases of Parentage Establishment 
Typically, parenthood is established by biology or adoption.56 Thus, it has 
been simple to regard the child's birth or adoptive mother as the child's legal 
mother. 57 Historically, fatherhood was established through marriage: a 
legitimate child was "born in lawful wedlock or within a competent time 
afierwards.,,58 In modem times, a woman's husband is presumed to be the 
legal father of a child she bears during the marriage or within 300 days of the 
termination of the marriage. 59 
In contrast, a child born out of wedlock was historically filiUS nullius-no 
one's son-and had no right to receive support or inheritance from his or her 
parents.60 Well into the twentieth century, nonmarital children had no right to 
inheritance or support from their fathers61 and the gap between the rights of 
marital and nonmarital children remained wide. Beginning in the 1960s, the 
Supreme Court issued a series of opinions that held that discrimination against 
nonmarital children was unconstitutional. 62 All states now have procedures by 
which to compel fathers to provide support for their nonmarital children.63 
56. E.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201, 9B U.LA. 309 (2000). 
57. With the advent of reproductive technology, situations now arise whereby the issue of legal 
maternity is more difficult to establish. Courts and legislatures are now confronted with conflicts 
between birth mothers, egg donor mothers, gestational surrogates, and the like. For example, Johnson v. 
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), involved a dispute between the egg donor mother and the 
birth/gestational mother. The court concluded that under California's version of the UPA, both women 
could assert valid claims of maternity, but the court viewed intent as the deciding factor in determining 
parentage. Because the egg donor mother and her husband had contracted with the surrogate to bear a 
child that they would raise, the court found the egg donor mother's intent to parent the child more 
compelling than the wishes of the surrogate. [d. at 780-82. 
The law is playing "catch-up" with these technological advancements and the revised UP A 
includes an entire Article concerning gestational agreements and how parenthood should be legally 
established pursuant to a validly executed agreement under Article Eight. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 
Art. 8, 9B U.LA. 360-70 (2000). 
58. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 4.1 (2d 
ed. West 1988) (quoting I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 446, 454 (Cooley 
4th ed. 1899». 
59. [d. § 4.4. 
60. Glennon, supra note 3, at 553. 
61. [d. 
62. See Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating 
Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Co parents, 50 BUFF. L REv. 341, 346 (2002) (citing Levy v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968» (ruling that Louisiana's Wrongful Death Act violated the Equal 
Protection Clause by denying recovery to a nonmarital child for the death of the mother); Weber v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (nonmarital child permitted to recover damages for 
.father's death under a state workers' compensation law). 
63. CLARK, supra note 58, at § 4.4. 
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In 1973, the Unifonn Parentage Act was promulgated to create equality for 
children born in and out of wedlock by introducing various means by which a 
man may be established as a child's legal father.64 Once paternity is 
established, the legal father has all of the benefits and responsibilities of legal 
parenthood. Legal parenthood assures a child of the right to receive fmancial 
support, qualify as a dependent on her parent's health insurance, collect Social 
Security benefits, sustain an action for wrongful death, recover under 
workmen's compensation, and, in many states, to inherit from her parent.65 
Legal parenthood includes many intangible benefits, too, such as the authority 
to make medical, educational, religious, and moral decisions on behalf of a 
child.66 Once a legal parent-child relationship is established, so, too, is the 
right to maintain a relationship with the child even if the child's parents 
separate. Divorce and paternity statutes provide fathers with custody and 
visitation rights, thereby preserving the father's ability to maintain an 
emotional bond with his child.67 
As noted above, historically, fatherhood could be established not only by 
biology, but through marriage, without any biological connection to the child. 
As modem paternity jurisprudence developed, so, too, did legal notions of 
fatherhood. Although the legal rights of marital fathers were well entrenched, 
several Supreme Court opinions, beginning with Stanley v. Illinois,68 began to 
recognize the rights of unmarried biological fathers. Through a series of cases 
addressing the legal right of unmarried biological fathers to have notice prior to 
the adoption of their biological children by other men, the Court developed the 
"biology plus" test, which recognized that biological fathers who have actively 
asserted their parental rights must receive notice of the child's mother's intent 
to have the child adopted.69 In articulating the "biology plus" test, the Court 
64. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr Prefatory note (1973), 98 U.L.A. 289 (2002). 
65. Jacobs, supra note 62, at 346. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Following the death of their mother, Stanley's children were removed 
from their home in compliance with an Illinois statute that presumed an unmarried, biological father was 
unfit to raise his children. The Court found that Stanley's due process and equal protection rights were 
violated and that the state must provide him with an opportunity to establish fitness prior to the 
children's removal. Id. at 658. 
69. In a series of three opinions, the Court made clear that recognition of legal fatherhood was 
dependent upon more than mere biology. In Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), the Court held 
that a man who had not sought to establish a relationship with his son could not prevent the child's 
adoption by the mother's husband, thereby upholding a Georgia adoption statute that required only the 
mother's consent to adoption unless the father had taken steps to legitimate his parental relationship. In 
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), the Court held that a New York adoption statute violated the 
petitioner's right to equal protection because it required consent only of the mother prior to the adoption 
proceeding. Unlike the father in Quilloin, the father in Caban had lived with his children and, after he 
moved out of the home, continued to contribute to their support and to see his children frequently (even 
having custody of them briefly). Finally, in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), the Court upheld a 
statute which imposed a time limitation for a putative father to establish a relationship with his child and 
held that due process does not require notice to a biological father who has not assumed any 
responsibility for his child nor manifested any parental function. The Court wrote, "The significance of 
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made clear that, while biology is a gateway to parenthood, biology alone is 
insufficient to protect a biological father's legal rights. It takes more than 
biology to be a parent. 
B. The Growing Recognition of Functional Parenthood 
Most recently, state courts have begun to recognize parental rights of 
nonbiological parents, illustrating the growing chasm within family law 
jurisprudence. Despite heightened (and I argue, misplaced) emphasis on 
biological connection in the paternity fraud context, more courts are 
recognizing the rights of functional parents to establish legal relationships with 
the children they have parented. For example, stepparents/a grandparents/ I 
foster parents,72 and gay and lesbian coparents73 have increasingly been 
recognized as functional parents entitled to maintain custodial or visitation 
relationships with children they have helped to raise. Moreover, advances in 
reproductive technology have caused courts to evaluate the legal parenthood of 
nonbiological parents who contract with either a surrogate, egg donor, and/or 
sperm donor and to make a determination of legal parenthood. Several of these 
courts have recognized that the "intended" parent should trump the parent with 
a biological connection to the child.74 Significantly, courts are recognizing that 
biology is not the only means by which to establish legal parenthood and 
the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to 
develop a relationship with his offspring." Id. at 262. 
For a greater analysis of the development of the biology plus principle, see WEISBERG & 
APPLETON, supra note 3, at 526-28. See also Janet 1. Dolgin, Just A Gene: Judicial Assumptions About 
Parenthood, 40 UCLA 1. REv. 637 (1993); Murphy, supra note 30, at 9-1 \. 
70. See, e.g., Nunn v. Nunn, 791 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing Indiana statute 
which permits de facto custodians (in this case, a stepfather) to establish custodial and/or visitation 
rights); Miller v. Millet, 478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984) (invoking principles of equitable estoppel to uphold 
stepfather's duty of child support). 
71. See, e.g., Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000) (finding that visitation, pursuant to the 
state's Grandparents Visitation Act, was appropriate and constitutional for grandparents who had 
functioned as children's parents for significant periods of time); see also Janet 1. Dolgin. The 
Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 102 COLUM. 1. REv. 337, 396-401 (2002) 
(reviewing several grandparent visitation cases from New York and California, some of which permit 
grandparent visitation). 
72. See, e.g., Smith v. O.F.F.E.R., 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (recognizing liberty interest in foster 
families in preserving relationships with children in their care); see also Kyle C. Velte, Towards 
Constitutional Recognition of the Lesbian-Parented Family, 26 N.Y.U. REv. 1. & SOC. CHANGE 245, 
277-81 (2000-2001) (discussing how Smith can be used by foster parents to maintain an ongoing 
relationship with their foster children and may also stand for the proposition that other third parties may 
have a similar liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with a child they have helped to raise). 
73. See, e.g., E.N.O. v. 1.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999) (holding that lesbian coparent was a 
de facto parent and probate court properly entered order permitting visitation between lesbian coparent 
and child); Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995) (holding that lesbian coparent was a 
psychological parent and could maintain an action for visitation with her nonbiological child). 
74. Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (holding that a child's intended parents, not sperm 
and egg donors nor gestational surrogates, are the child's legal parents); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 
776 (holding that egg donor/intended mother should be legal mother rather than gestational 
surrogatelbirth mother). 
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parental rights. Thus, the reliance upon biological connection to disestablish 
paternity is seemingly at odds with current efforts to expand the legal definition 
of "family" and to recognize the legal rights of persons who are not otherwise 
legal parents through biology or adoption. 
Before addressing the specific grounds for establishing legal parentage 
rights for persons without a biological or adoptive connection with a child, it is 
worth noting that these principles are predicated upon a nonbiological parent's 
desire to parent. This is in direct contrast with the paternity fraud cases in 
which men no longer wish to parent. But the underlying principles of estoppel 
are designed to protect the child's best interests, emotionally and financially. 
To create a legal dichotomy between establishing parentage and disestablishing 
parentage seemingly ignores the child's best interests in the latter situation. If 
courts recognize the importance of maintaining parental relationships in other 
contexts, why should biology be the determinative factor in disestablishing 
parentage? 75 
Recent studies indicate that genetic familial connections are less important 
than actual parenting. One recent study of adoptive, two-parent biological, 
single-mother and stepparent households suggest that genetic connections are 
hiss significant than previously believed. The authors found only limited 
support for the hypothesis that biological ties with two parents would 
significantly advantage children.76 Another recent study found positive 
outcomes for nongenetic children and noted that these outcomes suggest that 
"the absence of a genetic relationship, in itself, does not lead to difficulties for 
parents or children.,,77 
75. Throughout this Article, I emphasize that biology is but one factor in establishing parentage. 
As noted above, however, biology alone is oftentimes sufficient to establish parentage. For instance, the 
Uniform Parentage Act provides that a man who is genetically related to a child should be legally 
declared that child's parent. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 505(a), 9 U.L.A. 346 (2000). My emphasis on 
nonbiological means of establishing parentage goes to the fact that in paternity fraud cases, often years 
have elapsed before a man challenges his paternity. Because so much time has passed, children have 
often come to rely on that parent-child relationship--emotionally, financiaIJy, or both. Thus, paternity 
fraud cases actuaIJy bear similarity to situations in which nonbiological parents seek to maintain 
visitation or custodial rights with children they have helped to raise. In fact, not aIJ men who learn that 
they are the child's nonbiological father wish to terminate the parent-child relationship. See, e.g., 
Michael Higgins, Meaning of Dad Widened by Judge, CHI. TRlB., Sept. 17, 2004, at 1 (describing an 
Illinois judge's ruling that a man who signed a voluntary acknowledgement of parentage but is not the 
child's biological father remains the child's legal father. In fact, this case arose because the 
nonbiological father wished to maintain a parental relationship with the child in opposition to the 
mother's wishes). 
76. Jennifer E. Lansford et aI., Does Family Structure Maller? A Comparison of Adoptive, Two-
Parent Biological, Single-Mother, Stepfather, and Stepmother Households, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 
840,849 (2001). But see KRISTEN ANDERSON MOORE ET AL., CHILD TRENDS, MARRIAGE FROM A 
CHILD'S PERSPECTIVE: How DOES FAMILY STRUCTURE AFFECT CHILDREN, AND WHAT CAN WE Do 
ABOUT IT? 1-2 (Child Trends Research Brief, 2002) ("Children growing up with stepparents also have 
lower levels of weIJ-being than children growing up with biological parents. Thus, it is ... the presence 
of two biological parents that seems to support children's development.") 
77. Susan Golombok & Clare Murray, Social Versus Biological Parenting: Family Functioning 
and the Socioemotional Development of Children Conceived by Egg or Sperm Donation, 40 J. CHILD 
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There are a multitude of methods by which families are being formed and 
biology is but one component. In fact, biology may be irrelevant to a 
determination of parentage in certain cases. For instance, a married couple 
petitioned a California court to determine the legal parents of a baby born to a 
surrogate mother and anonymous semen donor.78 The court concluded that the 
married couple were the child's legal parents because they intended to parent 
the child and, but for their intention, the child would not have been born.79 In 
another case, a court was required to determine which woman was a child's 
mother: the surrogate, gestational mother or the egg donor.8o Again, focusing 
on the intent of one party over the other, the court concluded that the party who 
intended to parent the child was indeed the legal parent.81 
In other cases, functioning as a parent has caused courts to recognize a 
party's right to maintain an ongoing relationship with a child he or she has 
helped to raise. For instance, in Rubano v. DiCenzo, the Supreme Court: of 
Rhode Island held that a nonbiological lesbian mother who had coparented the 
child, intended to coparent the child, and functioned as a parent for a period of 
four years could successfully argue that she was a legal parent of the child 
based on the combined application of estoppel principles and the Uniform 
Parentage Act.82 Similarly, in v.c. v. MJ.B., the New Jersey Supreme Court 
held that a nonbiological lesbian coparent had functioned as a psychological 
parent and was entitled to visitation with the twins she had intended to parent 
and helped to raise.83 And in Youmans v. Ramos, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court held that a child's aunt was a de facto parent, and awarded her 
visitation rights over the custodial father's objections.84 
Several states have enacted legislation specifically recognizing the rights of 
de facto parents. In Indiana, for example, the legislature in 1999 amended 
PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 519, 525 (\999) (determining that genetic and nongenetic families did not 
differ with respect to quality of parenting or the psychological development of the child). 
78. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280. 
79. [d. 
80. Johnson, 851 P.2d 776. 
81. [d. 
82. 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000). In Rubano, a former same-sex partner petitioned for visitation with 
son with whom she had lived and helped raise for four years. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held 
that the former same-sex partner could prove her legal parentage pursuant to Rhode Island's version of 
the Uniform Parentage Act by establishing a de facto or psychological parental relationship, using 
standards similar to those articulated in the ALI Principles. [d. at 974-75. Significantly, the court 
specifically noted that biological parentage was not a requirement to proving parentage under the statute 
and that de facto parentage could sufficiently establish a legal parent-child relationship. [d. at 968. For 
a full discussion of the Rubano case, see Jacobs, supra note 62, at 383-89. 
83. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000). Similar to the Rubano case, v.c. involved a former 
same-sex partner who petitioned for custody and visitation rights with the twins she had helped to parent 
since their birth (she had also participated in the pregnancy). Although the court did not hold that a legal 
parent-child relationship existed, the court recognized that V.C. was a psychological parent (similar to 
parent by estoppel, discussed below) and awarded her ongoing visitation with the twins. 
84. 71\ N.E.2d 165 (Mass. 1999). 
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statutes governing certain custody proceedings to recognize the rights of de 
facto parents.85 The Indiana statute defines a de facto guardian, in part, as 
a person who has been the primary caregiver for, and financial 
supporter of, a child who has resided with that person for at least: (1) 
six months if the child is less than three years of age; or (2) one year if 
the child is at least three years of age.86 
Using the Indiana statute, the court of appeals of Indiana has recognized the 
right of a stepfather to maintain a claim of custody and visitation with the 
daughter that he had actively parented and cared for since her birth.87 
Kentucky and Minnesota have similarly enacted statutes recognizing the legal 
rights of de facto parents.88 
In addition to cases and state statutes recognizing the rights of 
nonbiological parents, both the UP A and ALI recognize that nonbiological 
parents may be entitled to the same rights and recognition as biological parents 
when they have functioned as a parent in a variety of respects. The American 
Law Institute has promulgated Principles governing the allocation of custodial 
and decision-making responsibility for children. The ALI Princples defme 
three types of "parents": legal parent, parents by estoppel, de facto parents.89 A 
legal parent is an individual who is defined as a parent under state law.90 A 
parent by estoppel is defined as: 
an individual who, though not a legal parent, ... (ii) lived with the 
child for at least two years and (a) over that period had a reasonable 
good-faith belief that he was the child's biological father, based on 
marriage to the mother or on the actions or representations of the 
mother, and fully accepted parental responsibilities consistent with that 
belief, and (b) thereafter continued to make reasonable, good-faith 
efforts to accept responsibilities as the child's father, even if that belief 
no longer existed; or (iii) lived with the child since the child's birth, 
holding out and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as a 
parent, a part of a prior co-parenting agreement with the child's legal 
85. Nunn v. Nunn, 791 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing amended statutes). 
86. IND. CODE § 31-9-2-35.5 (2004). 
87. Nunn, 791 N.E.2d at 786-87 (holding that where man had functioned as child's parent since 
birth and had actively fostered a parent-child relationship, biological mother could not preclude 
stepfather from maintaining custody and visitation action if such ongoing relationship would be in 
child's best interests). 
88. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1); MINN. STAT. § 257C.OI (2003). See Lowell F. Schechter, 
"De Facto Custodians" or "De Facto Parents": Alternative Approaches to Child Custody Reform (2003) 
(unpublished manuscript, presented at the International Society of Family Law North American 
Conference in Eugene, Oregon) (on file with author) (reviewing the de facto custodian statutes of 
Kentucky, Indiana, and Minnesota and discussing their application, and reviewing the ALI Principles 
and comparing them with the state statutes noted herein). 
89. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.03(1) (2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]. 
90. [d. § 2.03(1)(a). 
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parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents) to raise a child 
together with full parental rights and responsibilities, when the court 
finds that recognition as a parent is in the child's best interests; or (iv) 
lived with the child for at least two years, holding out and accepting 
full and permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an 
agreement with the child's legal parent (or, if there are two legal 
parents, both parents), when the court finds that recognition as a parent 
is in the child's best interests.91 
A de facto parent is defined, in part, as someone who regularly performed a 
share of caretaking functions at least as great as that of the parent with whom 
the child primarily lived.92 This emphasis both on functional parenthood and 
the child's best interests within the ALI Principles further serves to reinforce 
the necessity of looking beyond biology in establishing or disestablishing 
parentage. 
Additionally, the ALI Principles recognize the importance of intent and/or. 
time period of functional parenting for making a legal determination of 
parentage. Just as the UPA has incorporated a two-year statute of limitations 
for challenging a presumption of paternity or rescinding an acknowledgment of 
paternity, the ALI similarly recognizes that a two-year period of functional 
parenthood makes enough impact on the child that that period is sufficient to 
establish the rights and privileges of legal parenthood.93 Moreover, the ALI 
recognizes the importance of intent in determining the rights of functional 
parents. For example, a woman who actively participates in the conception, 
pregnancy, and birth of a child with her lesbian partner and further has an oral 
or written agreement to coparent that child may be recognized as a parent by 
estoppel even if she resides with the child for fewer than two years. 94 
Similarly, the UPA recognizes both biological and nonbiological bases of 
establishing legal fatherhood. The UP A provides several ways by which a 
father-child relationship may be established, including: 1) an unrebutted 
presumption of the man's paternity of a child under Section 204;95 2) an 
effective acknowledgment of paternity by the man, with the agreement of the 
mother, in a written document that has the same force and effect as an 
91. Id. § 2.03(1)(b). 
92. Id. § 2.03(1 )(c). 
93. As reprinted above, two of the means by which a person may be deemed a parent by estoppel 
involve living with the child for at least two years. PRINCIPLES, supra note 89, § 2.03 (l)(b)(ii) and (iv). 
Moreover, the ALI Principles includes in its definition of de facto parent a requirement that the 
individual lived with the child "for a significant period of time not less than two years." § 2.03 (l)(c). 
Thus, in creating functional families, a two-year period has been deemed significant enough to warrant 
full or partial legal parental status. My argument suggests that if two years is significant enough to 
warrant such legal recognition, we should not permit men who have functioned as parents for a greater 
length of time to disestablish their parental relationships. 
94. PRINCIPLES, supra note 89, § 2.03(1 )(b )(iii) & cmts. 
95. UNIF. PARENTAGEAcr § 201(b)(1), 98 V.L.A. 309 (2000). 
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adjudication of paternity;96 3) an adjudication of the man's paternity in a 
judicial proceeding;97 and 4) a divorce decree indicating that the man is the 
father of a child born during the marriage.98 Of these four bases of paternity, 
two are not predicated on biology. Within the paternity presumptions of UP A 
section 204, is a presumption predicated on openly holding out a child as his 
own and residing within the same household as the child for two years.99 The 
Comment for this section explains that the presumption of "holding oneself out 
as the father" has the same two-year durational requirement as the marital 
presumption. Once the presumption arises, it is subject to challenge in only 
limited circumstances and is also subject to estoppel principles. 1Oo Moreover, 
adhering to the common law presumption, a mother's husband is presumed to 
be the child's father, regardless of whether he is indeed the biological father. 1Ol 
As the UP A, ALI, and functional parenthood cases and statutes 
demonstrate, genetic connection with a child does not provide the exclusive 
method of establishing a parent-child relationship. In fact, it is becoming 
increasingly common to establish legal parent-child relationships without any 
genetic connection between a parent and child. Therefore, focusing on biology 
as the single most significant aspect of the parent-child relationship within the 
context of paternity disestablishment is at great odds with current family law 
trends. More significantly, while biology may suffice to establish a parent-
child relationship so that a man may develop an emotional relationship with his 
child, once such a relationship has been legally established and relied upon, as 
in the paternity fraud context, considering only biology to disestablish the 
parent-child relationship ignores the preexisting relationship. Relying solely on 
biology to disestablish an existing parent-child relationship ignores the fact that 
the child may have come to rely upon her father for emotional and/or financial 
support. As discussed below, in keeping with a heightened emphasis on 
functional parent-child relationships rather than on biological relationships, 
several courts have rejected paternity disestablishment claims. 
96. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(b)(2), 98 U.L.A. 309 (2000). As part of the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(5)(C), (the 
Welfare Reform Act) Congress conditioned federal child support enforcement funds on a requirement 
that states enact laws that greatly strengthen the effect of a man's voluntary acknowledgment of 
paternity. Thus, a valid, unrescinded and unchallenged acknowledgment of paternity is given the same 
force and effect as a judicial determination of paternity. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 3,98 U.L.A. 313 
(2000). 
97. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(b)(3), 98 u.L.A. 13 (Supp. 2002). 
98. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 637(c), 98 U.L.A. 352 (2002). Under this section, a divorce decree is 
determinative on the issue of paternity. 
99. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(5), 98 u.L.A. 14 (Supp. 2002). 
100. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 cmt., 98 U.L.A. 14 (Supp. 2002). 
101. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(I), 98 U.L.A. 14 (Supp. 2002). 
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III. ENFORCING PATERNITY JUDGMENTS AND REJECTING CLAIMS OF 
PATERNITY FRAUD 
A. Challenging Paternity Under the UPA and State Civil Procedure Rules 
The UP A not only provides various mechanisms by which a man can be 
established as a legal father, it also provides several ways by which the non-
existence of a parent-child relationship can be established. First, as noted 
above, presumptions of paternity can be rebutted by a judicial proceeding. 
However, the UP A includes a two-year statute of limitations during which the 
presumptions can be rebutted, except in situations where the presumed father 
did not cohabit with the child and the presumed father never held the chile! out 
as his own.102 Furthermore, an acknowledgment of paternity generally may be 
rescinded only within 60 days from either the effective date or the date of the 
fIrst hearing to adjudicate an issue pertaining to the child and to which the 
signatory is a party.103 After the sixty-day period has elapsed, a signatory to an 
acknowledgment of paternity may challenge the acknowledgment only if the 
challenge is made within two years after the ftling of the acknowledgment and 
if he can prove fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. 104 By maintaining a 
two-year statute of limitations even in instances of fraud, duress or material 
mistake of fact, the UPA drafters seem to recognize that after a two-year 
period, the father and child will have a relationship that cannot be severed 
without harm to the child and thus cannot be disestablished regardless of the 
circumstances. 
The UP A seeks to balance the rights of nonbiological father and child by 
including a two-year statute of limitations that applies to challenges to 
102. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607, 98 U.L.A. 341 (2002). The Comment to section 607 explains 
that if the presumed father never cohabited with the mother and child, did not engage in intercourse at 
the probable time of conception, and the presumed father never held the child out as his own, then the 
presumption should not be limited by the two-year statute of limitations. The drafters reason that in 
such a circumstance, nonpaternity is generally assumed by all of the parties. ld. 
103. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 307,98 U.L.A. 317 (2002). 
A signatory may rescind an acknowledgment of paternity ... by commencing a proceeding 
to rescind before the earlier of: (1) 60 days after the effective date of the acknowledgment ... 
or (2) the date of the first hearing, in a proceeding to which the signatory is a party, before a 
court to adjudicate an issue relating to the child, including a proceeding that establishes 
support. 
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(c)(D)(ii) (2004), in order to retain federal child support subsidies, 
state law must provide signatories with a right of rescission of an acknowledgment of paternity. UNIF. 
PARENTAGE ACT § 307,98 U.L.A. 317, ern!. at 317. 
104. UNIF. PARENT AGE ACT § 308, 98 U .L.A. 317 (2002). This section ensures that a legal father 
will not seek to disestablish his legal parenthood more than two years after he acknowledged paternity 
and further reinforces the principle that a man who voluntarily acknowledges paternity should not be 
able to change his mind, even if he later learns that he has no genetic connection to the child. The 
requirement of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact reinforces the principle that he has voluntarily 
undertaken the rights and responsibilities of parenthood and should not be relieved of those 
responsibilities. 
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presumptions of paternity, rescissions of acknowledgment of paternity, and 
third-party challenges to an adjudication of paternity. The only instance for 
which the two-year statute of limitations is extended is when the presumed 
father never cohabited with the child and never held the child out as his own. 
In that instance, the UP A drafters profess, neither the child nor the mother 
would have relied on the paternity presumption. lOS For all other presumptions, 
acknowledgments, and adjudications of paternity, the two-year statute of 
limitations applies. This two-year statute of limitations serves a reasonable 
purpose of ensuring that the best interests of the child are met. It preserves an 
intact parent-child relationship, while also providing a legal but nonbiological 
father with a reasonable amount of time to disestablish paternity if 
circumstances warrant. 106 
There are several contexts in which a man may want to challenge a 
paternity judgment. First, a man who was married to the child's mother may 
learn subsequent to a divorce proceeding that he is not the child's biological 
father. 107 Second, a man who has acknowledged paternity or was declared a 
legal father pursuant to a paternity judgment may also learn subsequent to those 
proceedings that he has no biological connection to the child. Often, courts 
apply principles of res judicata and estoppel to preclude paternity 
disestablishment in these situations. l08 The UPA provides that a divorce decree 
that expressly identifies a child as a "child of the marriage" or similar words or 
the divorce decree provides that the husband will pay support for the child has 
the binding effect of a determination of parentage. 109 The UP A provides that a 
signatory to an unrescinded acknowledgment of parentage and a man 
adjudicated as a legal father in a judicial proceeding are also bound by those 
judgments. llo Furthermore, the UPA provides that a man seeking to challenge 
the paternity judgment may challenge the adjudication only under state law 
relating to appeal, vacation of judgments, or other judicial review. III 
Typically, then, in their attempts to vacate a fmal paternity judgment, 
nonbiological fathers use their state's equivalent of Federal Rules of Civil 
105. See supra note 102. I thus infer that the UP A drafters believe that a challenge five, ten, or 
fifteen years later would not harm the child's best interests. The statute oflimitations that I propose does 
not include this exception. While I understand the UP A drafters' position that there is little emotional 
reliance on paternity in those circumstances, there are still financial and practical considerations that 
militate against such a result, namely access to governmental benefits and assistance and/or inheritance 
benefits. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text for discussion of the legal and tangible benefits 
to a child of a legal parental relationship. 
106. But see Brie S. Rogers, Note, The Presumption of Paternity in Child Support Cases: A 
Triumph of Law Over Bi%gy, 70 V. CIN. L. REv. 1151 (2002) (arguing that the UPA approach is too 
restrictive and that two years does not provide a sufficient time period in which to challenge paternity). 
107. For information concerning paternity challenges during divorce proceedings, see supra note 
26. 
108. See. e.g., infra Section III.B. 
109. VNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 637(c), 9B V.L.A. 352 (2000). 
110. VNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 637(a), 9B V.L.A. 352 (2000). 
Ill. VNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 637(e), 9B V.L.A. 352 (2000). 
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Procedure 60(b), which pennits a court to vacate a final judgment in the 
instance of fraud, duress, material mistake or other equitable reason. 112 For 
Rule 60(b) motions based upon allegations of fraud, mistake, or newly 
discovered evidence, the motion must be made within one year after the 
judgment was entered. ll3 A motion under Rule 60(b)(6), which permits the 
court to vacate a judgment for "any other reason justifying relief," must be 
made within a reasonable time. Determining what constitutes a reasonable time 
is particularly troublesome in the paternity fraud context. 114 Is it fair to require 
a man to support a child for another five, ten, or fifteen years if he knows the 
child is not his? But is it fair to vacate the judgment if he held himself out as 
the child's father for the previous ten years? It is also difficult to determine 
what constitutes a fraud upon the court or an intentional misrepresentation. 115 
Has the mother acted fraudulently if she did not reveal the possibility !hat 
another man might be the biological father of the child? Is that a fraud upon 
the court to warrant application of Rule 60(b) relief?116 And, even if the 
mother's conduct is deemed fraudulent, is it fair to the child and in the child's 
best interests to sever the father-child relationship? 
B. Cases Enforcing Paternity Judgments 
It has been difficult for legal fathers to disestablish paternity subsequent to 
a paternity judgment or divorce decree.1l7 As discussed above, a paternity 
judgment has binding effect and cannot easily be challenged. With the 
increased reliability and certainty of genetic testing, however, more men are 
challenging judgments of paternity and seeking relief, in particular, from child 
112. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). The rule provides: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party ... from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake... ; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move 
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud .... misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an 
adverse party; ... (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (I), (2), and (3) not more 
than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. 
113. Id. 
114. As discussed infra, cases in which courts deny paternity disestablishment claims, are often 
predicated in part on the notion that too much time has elapsed and it would be unfair to the child to 
disestablish paternity. Alternatively, however, several courts have permitted paternity disestablishment 
claims after many years. See Section IV.A. 
115. Compare Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488 (Mass. 2001) (holding that mother's actions of 
not telling adjudged father that he may not be biological father does not constitute fraud upon the court), 
with Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279 (pa. 2003) (holding that mother's misrepresentation of paternity 
was fraud and legal father could thus disestablish paternity). 
116. See, e.g., Nadine E. Roddy, The Preclusive Effect of Paternity Findings in Divorce Decrees, 
10 DIVORCE LITIG. 169, 172-73 (1998) (discussing the fraud exception to res judicata and citing cases in 
which the court determined that former husbands were not able to prove fraud to invoke the exception). 
117. Id. at 184 ("[T]he vast majority of states have held that [divorced husbands] are precluded 
from subsequently challenging a divorce decree's finding of paternity even when the wife 
misrepresented the husband's paternity or concealed the husband's nonpaternity from the husband and 
the court."). 
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support obligations. Many courts have denied such paternity disestablishment 
petitions, largely relying on the doctrines of res judicata, estoppel, or preclusion 
of the claim under Rule 60(b), either independently or in combination. Be1vw, 
I discuss several cases illustrating the complex balancing between the best 
interests of the child and fairness to the nonbiological father. 
In 2001, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied the petition ofa 
man who sought paternity disestablishment more than five years after he 
voluntarily acknowledged paternity of his daughter, Chery1.118 In November 
1993, the Massachusetts Department of Revenue (DOR), on behalf of the 
Department of Transitional Assistance and Cheryl's mother, filed a complaint 
to establish paternity and a support order for Chery1. 119 On December 16, 
1993, the father and mother executed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity 
and the father also executed a support agreement. 120 Despite the availability of 
genetic marker testing, the father did not subrnit to such testing prior to 
executing the acknowledgment and the record does not explain why. The same 
d . d d . d f . 121 ay, a JU ge entere a JU gment 0 paternIty. 
Following entry of the judgment, the father behaved as though he were 
Cheryl's father, and she always referred to him as "Daddy." He and his family 
visited and bonded with Cheryl; on two occasions he sought to expand his 
visitation rights with Cheryl, and he generally fostered a "substantial 
relationship" with her. 122 After his child support obligation was increased in 
1999, Cheryl's father for the first time made a motion for genetic testing and 
asserted that he doubted he was her biological father. He further alleged that he 
had doubted his paternity as early as Cheryl's birth and had information 
confirming his nonpaternity when Cheryl was two years old. 123 Twice his 
motions for genetic testing and reduction in child support were denied, and he 
then took Cheryl for genetic testing without the knowledge of her mother. 124 
The tests revealed that he was not Cheryl's biological father and, in January 
2000, he moved to vacate the paternity judgment and further moved for 
reimbursement of all the child support he had paid since 1993.125 In May 2000, 
118. Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d at 491-93 (noting that Cheryl was born in 1993 and suit was 
brought in 2000). 
119. [d. The DOR moved for a temporary order of support and an order that the father, mother, and 
child submit to genetic marker testing. [d. 
120. [d. 
121. [d. at 492. 
122. /d. 
123. [d. As grounds for his motion for genetic marker testing, Cheryl's father alleged that he bore 
little resemblance to Cheryl; that two friends of the mother told him subsequent to his paternity 
acknowledgment that he was not Cheryl's father; that testing of his semen in June 1996 indicated a low 
sperm count and infertility; and that Cheryl's mother had told him he was not Cheryl's father. [d. at 
493. 
124. [d. at 493. Under both my proposal and the UP A, a father is not permitted to take a child for 
genetic testing without first obtaining court approval, based upon a judicial determination that such 
testing would be in the child's best interests. See infra note 205. 
125. Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d at 491-93. 
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the parties were ordered to submit to genetic testing. The judge indicated that 
if the tests revealed that the father was not Chery1's biological parent, he would 
be entitled to relief because "the father's 'interests in no longer being obligated 
to support a child not his own' outweighed Cheryl's interests 'in maintaining a 
relationship with someone she believed to be her biological father. ",126 
Pursuant to Massachusetts Rules Civil Procedure 60(b), the father moved 
to have the judgment vacated.127 The court, noting the importance of the 
finality of paternity judgments, wrote that "consideration of what is in a child's 
best interests will often weigh more heavily than the genetic link between 
parent and child.,,128 The language of this passage demonstrates that the court 
is aware that a child's best interests will be best served by maintaining a 
functional parent relationship and that destroying that relationship solely for 
reasons of genetic identity does not likely benefit a child. Furthermore, the 
court noted, where the father and child have a substantial parent-child 
relationship, "an attempt to undo a determination of paternity is potentially 
devastating to a child who has considered the man to be the father.,,129 
Balancing the interests of Cheryl against those of her legal father, the court 
determined that Cheryl's interests outweighed his, despite conclusive evidence 
f . 130 o nonpaternIty. 
The father further argued that his petition should not be time barred 
because the mother perpetrated a fraud upon the court by failing to disclose that 
he may not have been biologically related to Cheryl. 13l The court found that 
the actions of Cheryl's mother did not meet the legal definition of fraud and 
denied the father's petition. The court further noted that it could neither protect 
Cheryl from learning that her legal father was not biologically related to her nor 
force her father to continue his emotional relationship with her; but it did 
specifically note that it could protect her financial security and other legal 
rights. 132 While not specifically articulating the principles of paternity by 
estoppel, the court essentially used those principles by denying the father's 
challenge because of his prior actions and his efforts to foster a relationship 
with her. Part of the importance of the fmality of the judgment, it seems, is the 
126. [d. at 494. 
127. It appears that he relied on either the appiication of MASS. R. elY. P. 60(b)(5), entitling him to 
have the judgment vacated if it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application, or application of rule 60(b )(6), permitting vacation of the judgment for any other equitable 
reason. Because the father moved to vacate the judgment based on newly discovered genetic evidence, 
the mother argued that the father was actually making a motion pursuant to rule 60(b) (1)-(3), and that 
therefore his claims were time barred because they were not made within one year. Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 
at 494. 
128. [d. at 495 (citing State ex rei. I.Z., 668 So.2d 566, 569 (Ala. 1995». 
129. [d. at 496 (citing Hackley v. Hackley, 426 Mich. 582, 598 n.11 (1986». 
130. [d. at 499. 
13 \. [d. at 498. The court stated that a fraud on the court involved the "most egregious conduct" 
involving the "corruption of lhe judicial process itself." [d. 
132. [d. at 498-99. 
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court's concern that Cheryl's interests be protected through continuity and 
stability of the father-child relationship. Where a father has affirmatively 
sought out a relationship with a child, he cannot later claim genetic 
nonpaternity as a means of discharging his parental obligation. While the 
ruling may not have helped Cheryl, who learned that her "daddy" was not 
related to her, the precedent should protect other children from such emotional 
harm. 
Courts have similarly denied divorced fathers the right to disestablish 
paternity years after entry of a divorce decree, i.e., years after legal fatherhood 
has been established. In Godin v. Godin,133 the Supreme Court of Vermont 
denied the request of a former husband who sought to vacate his paternity six 
years after the entry of a divorce decree. In Godin, the former husband became 
suspicious that he was not the biological father of Christina after hearing family 
rumors to that effect and based on questioning by Christina herself. 134 
Although he did not challenge paternity at any time during divorce proceedings 
and, in fact, stipulated to his paternity of Christina, he "realized" that ten 
months elapsed between Christina's alleged conception and her birth. 135 He 
sought genetic marker testing and to vacate that part of the divorce decree that 
established his paternity. 
Christina was fifteen years old when her father sought to disestablish 
paternity. Mr. Godin alleged that his ex-wife had perpetrated a fraud upon the 
court by alleging that Christina was his child and that the court should set aside 
his paternity and child support obligation.136 The court determined that merely 
alleging that Mr. Godin was Christina's biological father did not constitute 
fraud. Mr. Godin could have easily challenged paternity based on the elapsed 
time between alleged conception and birth at the time of divorce; this was not 
newly discovered evidence to warrant relitigation of the issue.137 Denying Mr. 
Godin's request for genetic testing and vacation of his paternity obligation, the 
court noted that Mr. Godin had lived with Christina as her father for the first 
eight years of her life and continued to treat her as his daughter for six years 
thereafter. 138 The court continued, "It is thus readily apparent that a parent-
child relationship was formed, and it is that relationship, and not the results of a 
genetic test, that must control.,,139 Recognizing that parenthood encompasses 
133. 725 A.2d 904 (Vt. 1998). 
134. [d. at 906. 
135. [d. 
136. [d. 
137. /d. at 908-09. In a rather draconian response to the Supreme Court of Vermont, the Vermont 
legislature has introduced legislation that would create the crime of ''paternity fraud." If the mother is 
found gUilty of this crime, she can be subject to a fine and imprisonment. Furthermore, the legal father 
can sue the mother for restitution and may also sue the biological father. See H.R. 735, 2002 Leg., 
2001-2002 Sess. (Vt. 2002), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.usldocsl2002lbills/intro/H-735.HTM. 
(Last visited November 21, 2004). 
138. [d. at 910-11. 
139. /d. at 911. 
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more than mere biology, the court also wrote, "[T]he presumption of paternity 
has assumed even greater significance today, as alternative methods of 
conception unrelated to 'biology' of the presumed parent have become more 
common." 140 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that a 
divorced father was precluded from challenging the paternity of his eleven-
year-old daughter, Crystal. 141 Five years after entry of the divorce decree, 
William filed a petition to terminate child support on the ground that he was not 
Crystal's biological father. 142 William argued that rigid application of res 
judicata would not serve the best interests of the child and suggested that it was 
preferential for Crystal to know the identity of her biological father. 143 The 
court disagreed: William had held himself out as Crystal's father and had 
exercised his right of visitation with her following the divorce. 144 Thus, the 
court determined that "undeniable harm" would result to Crystal if paternity 
were vacated. 145 The court further recognized that William himself had 
enjoyed the benefits of his representation as Crystal's father, including her love 
and affection. In making its ruling, the court emphasized the child's rights. 
The court discussed that while courts generally address children's rights within 
the larger context of competing adults' rights, the current trend is to give 
greater weight to children's rightS. 146 
140. Id. at 910. 
141. Betty L.W. v. William E.W., 569 S.E.Zd 77 (W. Va. ZOOZ). 
14Z. Id. at 80-81. 
143. Id. at 81. 
144. Id. at 86. 
145. Id. The court, citing its opinion in Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 387 S.E.Zd 866, 871 (W. Va. 
1989), wrote that the ''reviewing court must examine the issue of whether an 'individual attempting to 
disestablish paternity has held himself out to be the father of the child for a sufficient period of time 
such that disproof of paternity would result in undeniable harm to the child. ", Betty L. w., 569 S.E.Zd at 
8Z. 
146. Id. at 86. Specifically, the court relied upon the decisions in Wade v. Wade, 536 So.Zd 1158, 
1160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), in which the court refused to vacate a paternity finding where the father 
had enjoyed the benefits of fatherhood, including the child's love and affection, and In re Paternity of 
Cheryl, 746 N.E.Zd 488, discussed supra. In contrast, Judge Maynard in his dissent framed the issue, in 
part, as between the rights of the nonbiological father, who had unwittingly supported a child for eleven 
years, and the mother who had committed paternity fraud. 569 S.E.Zd at 87-88. Judge Maynard actually 
noted Vermont's introduction of criminal legislation concerning paternity fraud and while writing that 
that particular result would be too harsh, he continued, "[C]ertainly we can find a middle ground 
between jailing those who intentionally misrepresent paternity and rewarding them for their deception." 
Id. at 88. 
Judge Maynard also suggested that a child has a right to know his or her biological father, but 
offered no reason for that contention other than the importance of medical history. Id. While 
knowledge of one's medical history is certainly important, that does not address the parent-child 
relationship. Why would Judge Maynard terminate an actual parent-child relationship upon the mere 
hope that the child may learn the identity of her or his biological father? Moreover, there is no 
guarantee that the biological father will choose to establish a parental relationship with the child. Judge 
Maynard's argument is unpersuasive because it ignores the actual, functional parent-child relationship 
and looks merely at the promise of a parent-child relationship due to mere genetics. As the cases in Part 
IV illustrate, however, several courts agree with Judge Maynard that biological history alone may be a 
sufficient reason to disestablish paternity. 
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Courts that do not permit paternity disestablishment claims place the best 
interests of the child ahead of the best interests of the nonbiological father. In 
these cases, the child has an interest in maintaining the legal, financial, and 
often emotional security that stem from the paternity adjudication. The finality 
of the judgment serves an important purpose for the child-stability-that is 
deemed more significant than genetic "truth.,,147 While the father in these cases 
is not relieved of his parental responsibilities, he is also rewarded with an 
ongoing parent-child relationship. As Cheryl, Godin, and Betty W suggest, 
these nonbiological fathers have often nurtured positive relationships with their 
children and have derived emotional benefit from the parent-child relationship 
much as the children have. Ignoring the reality of the nonbiological father's 
functional parenthood places too much emphasis on biology and ignores the 
other aspects of fatherhood. Moreover, heightened emphasis on biology 
contrasts with the trend of legalizing the parent child relationship based solely 
on those other aspects of parenthood and not biology. 
In addition, these courts recognized the primacy of the child's best interests 
in maintaining an ongoing, functional parent-child relationship. As the Cheryl 
opinion states, "[C]onsideration of what is in a child's best interests will often 
weigh more heavily than the genetic link between parent and child.,,148 This 
147. Even in cases in which !he child and fa!her have not enjoyed an emotional1y significant 
parent~hild relationship, a court may recognize the importance of preserving the legal relationship, if 
for no other reason than preserving the child's legal identity and legal rights. For example, twelve years 
after J.T. was adjudicated the father of S.l., he filed a motion seeking to set aside !he paternity 
judgment. In State ex rei. J.l., the Supreme Court of Alabama determined that no extraordinary 
circumstances existed to justify relief from a paternity judgment twelve years after its entry, even if 
blood or genetic testing revealed that J.T. was not S.l.'s biological father. 668 So.2d 566 (Ala. 1995). 
In 1980, the state brought a paternity action on behalf of the mo!her to establish J.S.T. as the legal father 
of S.l. J.T. moved for blood tests, but did not appear for blood testing nor did he appear at subsequent 
hearings. Thus, a default judgment was entered. !d. at 568. Between January 1981, when the default 
judgment was entered, and 1992, when 1. T. received notice of a tax lien, he was in and out of jail, had 
little or no contact with !he child, and (as noted by the trial court) nei!her !he mother nor child relied on 
J.T.'s adjudication oflegal fatherhood. 
When the state sought to enforce J.T.'s child support obligation, he claimed that he had been 
unaware of the default judgment and requested blood tests in addition to filing a Rule 60(b)(6) motion to 
set aside the paternity judgment. The Supreme Court of Alabama ruled that twelve years did not 
constitute a reasonable time under Rule 60(b )(6) to bring a motion to vacate the paternity judgment, that 
the interests of finality required that the litigation not be reopened, and !hat an order for blood testing 
should not be granted. Id. at 570-71. Moreover, the court determined that J.T., even as a pro se litigant, 
had a responsibility to be aware of the proceedings against him and he could not claim !hat he had no 
knowledge of the judgment for twelve years. 
The court briefly addressed the importance of the finality of paternity judgments, al!hough it 
did not formally address the best interests of the child. However, the emphasis on !he importance of the 
finality of paternity adjudications al10ws me to infer that !he court was concerned wi!h !he negative 
effect vacating a twelve-year-old paternity judgment would have on the child. Moreover, in !he difficult 
challenge to balance the best interests of children and !heir nonbiological fathers, the court was able to 
put the best interests of the child first because the father had engaged in such an unreasonable delay. 
Had the father sought blood testing twelve years earlier-or even moved for blood tests soon after !he 
default judgment entered-!he court would likely have decided !his case differently. Id. 
148. Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d at 495 (citing J.z., 668 So.2d at 569). 
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demonstrates the court's demarcation between a child's best interests and the 
genetic link between parent and child. 
N. PATERNITY DISESTABLISHMENT CASES AND STATUTES 
In contrast to the cases in which the best interests of the child prevail and 
paternity disestablishment is not permitted, several courts have permitted 
disestablishment petitions. In addition, several states have enacted statutes 
which specifically permit paternity disestablishment under certain 
circumstances. Unlike the previously discussed cases, these cases and statutes 
either do not consider the child's best interests or presume that genetic identity 
serves the best interests. Moreover, the best interests discussion is often framed 
in terms of the nonbiological father's best interests. Several of the paternity 
disestablishment cases and statutes are discussed below. 
A. Cases Permitting Paternity Disestablishment 
Although many courts have rejected the attempts of legal fathers to 
disestablish paternity based on genetic testing subsequent to a paternity 
judgment, recently several courts have allowed nonbiological fathers to 
disestablish their nonpaternity. The Maryland Court of Appeals determined in 
Langston v. Riffel49 that the issue of paternity disestablishment does not require 
a balancing test between the competing best interests of child and adjudicated 
father. In fact, the court stated that the best interests of the child have no place 
in the disestablishment of paternity because the child's best interests are not 
considered in establishing paternity in the first instance. 150 
Langston actually involved three separate paternity appeals in which men 
previously adjudicated to be the father of a child moved to set aside those 
judgments based on new evidence that each man was not the father. l5l In all 
three cases, the men voluntarily acknowledged their paternity and did not 
request blood or genetic testing prior to acknowledging paternity. 
Subsequently, each man learned that he might not be the biological father of the 
child and sought genetic testing. The main issue before the Court of Appeals 
was phrased as follows: "whether the trial court must consider the 'best 
interests of the child' prior to ruling on whether to allow the post-declaration 
149. 754 A.2d 389 (Md. App. Ct. 2000). 
ISO. Id. at 406. Discussing the ability of men formerly adjudicated as fathers to obtain genetic 
testing, the court wrote that, 
[T]he Legislature intended for blood or genetic tests to be made available ... to any putative 
father seeking to challenge a paternity declaration previously entered against him in which 
such blood or genetic evidence test was not introduced. Moreover, an examination of the 
best interests of the child has no place in that determination. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
151. Id. at 390. 
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blood or genetic testing and the reconsideration ofpaternity.,,152 The court held 
that a putative father who seeks to set aside a paternity declaration is 
automatically entitled to such test without consideration of the child's best 
. 153 
mterests. 
By rejecting any consideration of the child's best interests, the court gives 
the green light to any father who wishes to disestablish paternity, regardless of 
the length or extent of the parent-child relationship. In fact, what is so apparent 
about the best interests discussion in Langston is that if the court were required 
to consider the child's best interests, the court would likely reject the 
disestablishment petitions. By sidestepping the best interests analysis, the court 
can sever the parent-child relationship despite the emotional and fmancial harm 
to the child. 
In stark contrast with the decision in Paternity of Cheryl, the Mississippi 
Supreme Court recently held that a paternity judgment could be vacated more 
than nine years after its entry. In MA.S. v. Mississippi Department of Human 
Services,154 the father, M.A.S., agreed that he was the father of S.M., signed an 
acknowledgment of paternity when he was seventeen years old, and agreed to 
pay child support. 155 DNA testing performed in an unrelated matter revealed 
that M.A.S. was not the biological father of S.M., and he sought to set aside the 
paternity and child support orders. 156 Pursuant to Mississippi Rules of Civil 
Procedure 60(b)(6), the court set aside the paternity judgment, determining that 
it would be "profoundly unjust" to require M.A.S. to continue making child 
support payments. 157 Although the court noted that collateral estoppel would 
generally preclude M.A.S.'s claim, the court found that the new DNA evidence 
proving M.A.S.'s nonpaternity was extraordinary and compelling enough to 
warrant vacation of the prior judgment despite the nine-year interval. I58 
Rather than placing emphasis on the child's best interests in preserving the 
parent-child relationship, the court's focus centered on the best interest of the 
father, M.A.S. The court noted multiple times that requiring the nonbiological 
father to continue making support payments would be manifestly unjust. 159 
The court further noted that "DRS and the mother have not been prejudiced by 
the failure to seek relief sooner. The mother received child support payments 
for approximately ten years from the wrong person.,,160 In so doing, the court 
did not hold M.A.S. responsible for voluntarily signing the acknowledgment of 
152. [d. at 392. 
153. Langston involved detailed analysis of Maryland statutes permitting disestablishment of 
paternity. The statute is discussed infra at Section IV.B. 
154. 842 So.2d 527 (Miss. 2003). 
155. [d. at 528. 
156. [d. 
157. [d. 
158. [d. at 530-31. 
159. [d. at 531. 
160. [d. at 530. 
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paternity despite his request for a blood test. In fact, the court placed no 
responsibility upon M.A.S. and instead saw him as a hero who had supported 
another man's child for nearly ten years. The language used by the court is 
telling; by writing specifically of the fact that neither the mother nor the state 
agency suffered any prejudice, the court completely ignored the child's 
interests. The court never referred to the effect of its decision on the child, but 
only the ruling's effect on the nonbiological father. The court did not discuss 
the relationship between M.A.S. and S.M., how the relationship benefited them 
both, how M.A.S. had received the benefits of parenting for nearly ten years, or 
that S.M. might be traumatized by this decision. The court's focus was on the 
injustice to M.A.S., and it failed to consider the injustice, stigma, or emotional 
trauma for S.M. 
Three months after issuing its decision in M.A.S., the Supreme Court of 
Mississippi ruled that a divorced husband could disestablish paternity of his 
child nine years after the child's birth. In Williams v. Williams, the court 
"refuse [ d] to sanction the manifest injustice of forcing a man to support a child 
that science has proven not to be hiS.,,161 The facts of Williams reveal that the 
parties separated when the child, Marcus, was approximately one month old, 
and they divorced about two years later. 162 The divorce decree provided that 
Willie was Marcus' father. Willie and Marcus did not have a close relationship 
and did not regularly see each other, although they did have several visits. 
During one visit, Willie noticed that Marcus bore little resemblance to him. 163 
Willie had a genetic test that confirmed that Marcus was not his biological son 
and sought to disestablish paternity.l64 His petition to disestablish paternity 
was denied based on res judicata and collateral estoppel, so he decided to bring 
a petition on behalf of Marcus against himself, Marcus' mother, and the man 
Willie thought was, in fact, Marcus' biological father. 165 Genetic testing 
proved that neither man was Marcus' biological father. 166 The chancellor 
denied Willie's petition and Willie appealed. 
Relying on MA.S., the court stated that fmality should yield to fairness. 
The court reasoned that although the child may be an innocent victim of his 
parent's problems, "the law will not compel one who has stood in the place of a 
parent to support the child after the relationship has ceased.,,167 Addressing the 
161. 843 So.2d 720, 723 (Miss. 2003) 
162. Id. at 721. 
163. Id. 
164. The way the facts are presented, it appears that Willie had a private paternity test conducted, 
without the prior approval of the court. The court makes no mention of a motion for paternity testing. It 
is also unclear whether Willie sought the mother's permission before submitting Marcus to paternity 
testing. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. (citing NPA v. WBA, 380 S.E.2d 178, 181 (Va. 1989), which held that husband who had 
embraced a child as his own for four years should not be liable for ongoing child support after genetic 
testing proved the child was in fact not biologically related). 
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issue of the child's best interests, the court merely stated, "We believe that the 
best interest of the child, in the factual scenario presented, is to know the 
identity of the natural father.,,168 The court offered no explanation why 
knowledge of Marcus' biological father would serve his interests better than 
maintaining an existing, nine-year parent-child relationship. More 
significantly, the court was offered compelling evidence that the mother did not 
know the identity of Marcus' biological father. 169 While the court specifically 
noted that Willie and Marcus did not have a substantial relationship, the court 
further noted that courts may terminate support obligations (and, by inference, 
disestablish paternity) when the child and legal father have a more substantial 
I · hi 170 re atlOns p. 
A recent Pennsylvania opinion similarly discounts the best interests of the 
child and focuses solely upon the rights of the nonbiological father to have his 
paternity judgment vacated. In Doran v. Doran, the ex-husband moved to 
vacate his child support obligation after genetic testing revealed that his 
probability of paternity was zero percent.171 Doran had never questioned 
paternity prior to or during the parties' divorce, at which time the child, Billy, 
was five years old.172 A year or so later, however, Doran questioned his 
paternity, but his former wife told him he was Billy's father. 173 Several years 
later, Doran questioned his paternity again and convinced his ex-wife to allow 
Billy to go for genetic testing. The testing revealed Doran's nonpaternity.174 
He then moved to vacate the child support order and underlying paternity order. 
Furthermore, he "as gently as possible removed himself from the child's life in 
168. Id. By absolving Willie of all parental responsibility, the court effectively "illegitimized" 
Marcus. The court offered no compelling rationale for its result. In addition, the court's blind faith that 
knowing one's biological father serves a child's best interests contains two major flaws. First, there is 
no evidence to suggest that the biological father would want to engage in parent-child relationship, thus 
the court is terminating a functional relationship in the hopes that another one will magically materialize. 
Second, some studies suggest that nonbiological parents can and do ''parent'' every bit as well as 
biological parents and that there is no substantive advantage to being raised by two biological parents. 
See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. But see MARY PARKE, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL 
POLICY, ARE MARRIED PARENTS REALLY BETTER FOR CHILDREN? I (Couples and Marriage Series, 
Policy Brief No.3, 2003) ("Most researchers now agree ... that, on average, children do best when 
raised by their two married, biological parents who have low-conflict relationships.") 
169. Williams, 843 So.2d at 721. 
170. Id. at 722-23 (citing NPA, 380 S.E.2d 178 and In re Bethards, 526 N.W.2d 871 (Iowa Ct. App. 
1994». 
171. 820 A.2d 1279 (Pa. 2003). This case represents a significant change for the Pennsylvania 
judiciary, which had previously decided in 1997 that an ex-husband could not disestablish paternity 
despite genetic proof of nonpaternity. Miscovich v. Miscovich, 688 A.2d 726 (1997); see also 
discussion supra note 8. In Miscovich, the court characterized the ex-husband's attempt to disestablish 
paternity as disgusting. 688 A.2d at 732. Despite similar facts, the Pennsylvania court changed course 
in Doran and emphasized its disgust with the wife who did not reveal her child's biological father. 820 
A.2d at 1281. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
HeinOnline -- 16 Yale J.L. &. Feminism 226 2004
226 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 16:193 
a way which he felt would cause the child the least amount of anguish and 
hurt.,,175 
Beginning its analysis, the court examined the applicability of the marital 
presumption and whether it should preclude Doran's claim of nonpatemity. 
The court noted that the marital presumption of paternity was designed to 
preserve families and, in light of the parties' divorce, did not apply.176 More 
significantly, however, the court stated that estoppel did not apply in this case 
because of the wife's fraud. 177 The court said that Doran would never have 
held himself out as Billy's father, acted as a parent, provided him emotional 
and fmancial support if not for the ex-wife's misrepresentation of Doran's 
paternity.178 The court quoted and adopted in large part the trial judge's 
opinion; the characterizations of both parties by the trial judge reflect the 
rhetoric of paternity fraud activists who paint the nonbiological father as a hero 
who supported another man's child as a result of the deceit of the child's 
mother. In evaluating the actions of Billy's mother, the trial court wrote, 
"Unfortunately, her deceit, falsehoods and misrepresentations gave Mr. Doran 
no reason but to treat the child as his own-with love, care and respect, as only 
a decent human being would do under the circumstances.,,179 
What I find most fascinating about the court's characterization is that it 
depicts Doran as a loving, caring father; if this is so, why is he so anxious to 
sever all ties with this child? Even though he has no genetic tie to Billy, he has 
fostered a loving, parenting relationship--no different from an adoptive father, 
stepfather, or other nonbiological parent. How is the parent-child relationship 
any different now that the father knows he shares no genetic material with his 
son? Nowhere in the opinion does the court address Billy's best interests and 
the trauma he likely experienced when, at age eleven, his father "gently 
removed himself' from his life. Moreover, the court does not see beyond 
biology, even while lauding the many other aspects of fatherhood Doran 
175. [d. (quoting the lower court's decision, Order No. DR-454 of 1994 (Penn. Ct. Com. PI. 2002». 
176. [d. at 1283 ("The policy underlying the presumption of paternity is the preservation of 
marriages .... The presumption only applies in cases where that policy would be advanced by the 
application; otherwise, it does not apply.") (quoting Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 723 (pa. 1999». 
177. 
The presumption that a child born during a marriage is a child of the marriage and the 
doctrine of paternity by estoppel grew out of a concern for the protection of the family unit; 
where that unit no longer exists, it defies both logic and fairness to apply equitable principles 
to perpetuate a pretense. In this case, application of estoppel would punish the party that 
sought to do what was righteous and reward the party that has perpetrated a fraud. 
[d. at 1283-84 (quoting Seko1 v. Delsantro, 763 A.2d 405, 410 (pa. Super. Ct. 2000». 
Interestingly, the court writes of concern for the protection of the family unit but never 
engages in a discussion concerning protection for the child. While the parties are no longer married, 
why does the court seem eager to further disintegrate the family unit by disestablishing paternity? Isn't 
the purpose of estoppel to protect the parent and child relationship, not merely to preserve an intact 
nuclear family? See supra Section 1I.B for a discussion of functional parenthood, including parentage 
by estoppel, and its use to protect multiple types of nontraditional parent-child relationships. 
178. Doran, 820 A.2d at 1284. 
179. /d. (quoting the lower court's decision, Order No. DR-454 of 1994 (Penn. Ct. Com. PI. 2002». 
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exhibited. By dismissing the functional aspects of parenthood as secondary to 
biology, the court trivializes Doran's years of parenting and renders Billy 
fatherless. 
B. Statutes Permitting Paternity Disestablishment 
Several states have enacted legislation explicitly permitting paternity 
disestablishment upon a clear showing of genetic impossibility of paternity. 180 
These statutes enable courts to circumvent the typical strictures of the fmality 
of judgments; specifically, these statutes provide a loophole to the typical Rule 
60(b) application. Some paternity set-aside statutes contain no statute of 
limitations and allow for a paternity challenge at any time;181 others contain 
various limitations on the time during which a petitioner may challenge 
paternity.182 Additionally, several statutes mandate that a court shall set aside a 
paternity judgment if blood or genetic tests clearly prove an absence of 
biological connection between a legal father and his child. 183 Others grant 
courts discretion to set aside the paternity judgment. 184 
The Maryland statute is illustrative of laws mandating paternity 
disestablishment without a statute of limitations. In 1995, Maryland modified 
its paternity laws to allow a paternity judgment to be set aside if a blood or 
genetic test establishes the exclusion of the individual named as the father in 
ISO. See generally Louis J. Tesser, Dad or Duped? Post-Appeal Challenges to Paternity 
Judgments, FAM. ADVoc., Fall 2002, at 29 (discussing several paternity fraud statutes and the various 
approaches states have used in permitting paternity disestablishment). 
IS\. See. e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-7-54 (2002) (permitting a petitioner to bring a motion to set 
aside a determination of paternity at any time); IOWA CODE § 600B.4IA(3)(a) (2003) (establishment of 
paternity may be overcome if the action is filed prior to the child reaching majority). 
IS2. See. e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.166 (b)(2) (2002) (providing that a petition to disestablish 
paternity may be brought "only within three years after the child's birth or three years after the petitioner 
knew or should have known of the father's putative paternity of the child, whichever is later"); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 257.57(b) (West 2003) 
For the purpose of declaring the nonexistence of the father and child relationship ... only if 
the action is brought within two years after the person bringing the action has reason to 
believe that the presumed father is not the father ofthe child, but in no event later than three 
years after the child's birth. 
(emphasis added). 
IS3. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-115 (2003). The Arkansas statute provides, in part: 
When any man has been adjudicated to be the father of a child or is deemed to be the father 
of a child pursuant to an acknowledgment of paternity without the benefit of scientific testing 
for paternity and as a result was ordered to pay support, he shall be entitled to one (I) 
paternity test ... at any time during the period of time that he is required to pay child support 
upon the filing of a motion challenging the adjudication or acknowledgment of paternity. 
Id. § 9-10-115(e)(I)(A). The statute further provides that: 
[i]fthe test administered under subdivision (e)(I)(A) of this section excludes the adjudicated 
father or man deemed to be the father pursuant to an acknowledgment of paternity as the 
biological father of the child and the court so finds, the court shaH set aside the previous 
finding or establishment of paternity 'and relieve him of any future obligation of support as of 
the date of finding. 
§ 9-1 0-115(t)(1). 
IS4. E.g., 750 ILL. COMPo STAT. 45 § 7(b-5) (2004) ("If, as a result of ... [DNA] tests, the plaintiff 
is determined not to be the father of the child, the adjudication of paternity ... may be vacated."). 
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the order. 18S Moreover, any party may request a blood or genetic test at any 
time, even after the entry of the final paternity order, if blood or genetic testing 
did not occur prior to the entry of the order. 186 As discussed above, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals in Langston v. Riffe interpreted these statutes to 
exclude any consideration of the best interests of the child and to place all 
emphasis on the blood or genetic test results. 187 The Maryland statute contains 
no statute of limitations and, as such, a claim to disestablish paternity may be 
brought at any time. As Langston reveals, a man may have been adjudicated 
the legal father or even acknowledged paternity of a child and then request 
genetic testing years after the judgment or order of paternity was entered. 
Without any consideration of the child's best interests, the court will permit 
such testing and, if the test reveals that the man is not the biological father, 
paternity may be disestablished. 188 
185. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1038 (2003). In discussing the finality of paternity 
declarations, the statute provides: 
(a)(I) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a declaration of paternity is 
final. 
(2)(i) A declaration of paternity may be modified or set aside: 
2. If a blood or genetic test done in accordance with § 5-1029 of this subtitle 
establishes the exclusion of the individual named as the father in the order. 
(ii) Notwithstanding subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, a declaration of paternity may 
not be modified or set aside if the individual named in the order acknowledged 
paternity knowing he was not the father. 
Id. § 5-1038(a). 
186. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1029. Blood or Genetic Tests 
(b) In general On the motion of the Administration, a party to the proceeding, or on its own 
motion, the court shall order the mother, child, and alleged father to submit to blood or 
genetic tests to determine whether the alleged father can be excluded as being the father of 
the child. 
(f) Laboratory report as evidence (1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (3) of this 
subsection, the laboratory report of the blood or genetic test shall be received in evidence if: 
(i) definite exclusion is established; or 
(ii) the testing is sufficiently extensive to exclude 97.3% of alleged fathers who are not 
biological fathers, and the statistical probability of the alleged father's paternity is at 
least 97.3%. 
187. 754 A.2d 389 (Md. App. Ct. 2000). The court wrote: 
We hold ... that the Legislature intended for blood or genetic tests to be made available, 
upon a motion, to any putative father seeking to challenge a paternity declaration previously 
entered against him in which such blood or genetic test evidence was not introduced. 
Moreover, an examination of the best interests of the child has no place in that determination. 
Id. at 406. 
188. The statute does not mandate that paternity shall be disestablished; instead, the language of the 
statute (as reproduced supra note 185) provides that a declaration of paternity may be modified or set 
aside. However, the set aside provision contains no best interests requirement. Interestingly, the 
statutory subsection concerning "other orders subject to modification," (e.g., support and/or arrearages) 
does include a best interests test. Without best·interests language concerning the paternity set aside, it is 
unlikely that a court will feel obligated to maintain a paternity order when genetic testing reveals 
biological nonpaternity. In particular, the court's holding that best interests of the child should not be 
considered either in making a determination to permit genetic testing nor "in the consideration of 
paternity" means that Maryland judges will have little discretion in paternity set aside cases. Langston, 
754 A.2d at 411. 
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Georgia recently enacted a paternity set-aside statute as well, which 
contains no statute of limitations and in certain instances, provides for 
mandatory paternity disestablishment. Georgia's statute allows a man to bring 
a motion to set aside paternity by filing an affidavit that newly discovered 
evidence has come to his knowledge since entry of the judgment and that the 
results from scientifically credible parentage-determination genetic testing 
finds that there is zero percent probability that the male is the child's biological 
father. 189 The statute further provides that "[t]he court shall grant relief ... 
upon a finding" that the test was properly conducted, that the man has not 
adopted the child, that the child was not conceived by artificial insemination, 
that the man did not act to prevent the biological father from asserting his 
paternal rights, and that he has not done any of the following acts knowing that 
he is not the biological father: (1) married the child's mother; (2) acknowledged 
paternity in a sworn statement; (3) been named, with his consent, as the child's 
father on the birth certificate; (4) been required to support the child based on a 
written promise; (5) received notice from any agency requiring him to submit 
to genetic testing which he disregarded; or (6) signed a voluntary 
acknowledgment of paternity. 190 
As noted, the Georgia law contains no statute of limitations and 
furthermore does not provide for any best interests analysis. Thus, a man who 
has acted as a child's father for ten years, but who had no knowledge of his 
genetic nonpaternity, may petition for paternity disestablishment, and the court 
must set aside the judgment upon a showing of genetic nonpaternity. Even if 
the result would be injurious to the child, the court is given no discretion under 
the statute. Moreover, the statute further provides that even if a man is not 
entitled to the mandatory, automatic relief discussed above (because he does 
not meet each necessary requirement), he may petition for paternity 
disestablishment nonetheless. Section 19-7 -54( c) of the Official Code of 
Georgia Annotated provides that if the petitioner fails to make the requisite 
showing under section 19-7-54(b), the court may still enter an order as to 
paternity as otherwise provided by law. 191 This section similarly contains no 
analysis of the child's best interests and no statute of limitations. Georgia thus 
189. GA. CODE~. § 19-7-54(a) (2002). Specifically, 
In any action in which a male is required to pay child support as the father of the child, a 
motion to set aside a determination of paternity may be made at any time upon the grounds 
set forth in this Code section. Any such motion shall be filed in the superior court and shall 
include: 
(I) An affidavit executed by the movant that the newly discovered evidence has come 
to movant's knowledge since the entry of judgment; and 
(2) The results from scientifically credible parentage-determination genetic testing ... 
and administered within 90 days prior to the filing of such motion, that finds that there 
is a zero percent probability that the male ordered to pay such child support is the father 
of the child for whom support is required. 
/d. (emphasis added). 
190. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-54(b) (2004) (emphasis added). 
191. § 19-7-54(c). 
HeinOnline -- 16 Yale J.L. &. Feminism 230 2004
230 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 16:193 
provides both mandatory and discretionary relief without any time limitation or 
consideration of the child's best interests. 
Similarly, the Ohio legislature has enacted Ohio Revised Code sections 
3119.961 and 3119.962 that allow a court to grant relief from a paternity 
judgment. l92 Rather than relying on the provisions of Rule 60(b), the statute 
provides that a court shall grant relief from a paternity and/or child support 
order if the man can provide genetic tests which disprove paternity, if he has 
not adopted the child, and if the child was not conceived as a result of artificial 
insemination. In fact, section 3119.961 specifically provides that, 
notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 60(b) , the court shall vacate the 
192. OHIO REv. CODE. ANN. § 3119.961 (Anderson 2002). Section 3119.962 of the Code 
provides: 
(A)(I) Upon the filing ofa motion for relief under section 3119.961 of the Revised Code, a 
court shall grant relief from a final judgment, court order, or administrative determination or 
order that determines that a person or male minor is the father of a child or from a child 
support order under which a person or male minor is the obligor if all of the following apply: 
(a) The court receives genetic test results from a genetic test administered no 
more than six months prior to the filing of the motion for relief that finds that 
there is a zero per cent probability that the person or male minor is the father of 
the child. 
(b) The person or male minor has not adopted the child. 
(c) The child was not conceived as a result of artificial insemination .... 
(2) A court shall not deny relief from a final judgment, court order, or administrative 
determination or order that determines that a person or male minor is the father of a 
child or from a child support order under which a person or male minor is the obligor 
solely because of the occurrence of any of the following acts if the person or male 
minor at the time of or prior to the occurrence of that act did not know that he was not 
the natural father of the child: . 
(a) The person or male minor was required to support the child by a child support 
order. 
(b) The person or male minor validly signed the child's birth certificate ... 
(c) The person or male minor was named in an acknowledgment of paternity of 
the child that a court entered upon its journal .... 
(d) The person or male minor was named in an acknowledgment of paternity of 
the child that has become final .... 
(e) The person or male minor was presumed to be the natural father of the child 
under any of the circumstances listed in section 3111.03 of the Revised Code .... 
(g) The person or male minor was determined to be the father of the child in a 
parentage action under Chapter 3111 of the Revised Code. 
(h) The person or male minor otherwise admitted or acknowledged himself to be 
the child's natural father. 
(8) A court shall not grant relief from a final judgment, court order, or administrative 
determination or order that determines that a person or male minor is the father of a child or 
from a child support order under which a person or male minor is the obligor if the court 
determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person or male minor knew that he 
was not the natural father of the child before any of the following: 
(I) Any act listed in divisions (A)(2)(a) to (d) and (A)(2)(f) of this section occurred. 
(2) The person or male minor was presumed to be the natural father of the child under 
any of the circumstances listed in divisions (A)(I) to (3) of section 3111.03 of the 
Revised Code. 
(3) The person or male minor otherwise admitted or acknowledged himself to be the 
child's father. 
(emphasis added). 
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orders. 193 Even if the man was required to pay support, held himself out as a 
father, signed the birth certificate and so forth, those actions will not bar a 
claim for relief under section 3119.962 unless it is proven by a preponderance 
of the evidence that he engaged in those actions and knew that he was not 
biologically related to the child. Furthermore, section 3119.967 provides that a 
party is entitled to relief under section 3119.962 regardless of whether the 
judgment, order, or determination from which relief is sought was issued prior 
to, on, or after October 27, 2000.194 Thus, the legislature has, in effect, 
provided a statutory scheme to circumvent the application of Rule 60(b) and the 
principle of res judicata as long as the petitioner can provide genetic evidence 
of nonpaternity. 
Interestingly, two Ohio courts of appeal have declared these statutes 
unconstitutional. In Van Dusen v. Van Dusen, the Ohio Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth District held that these statutes violated the separation of powers 
doctrine because the legislature essentially dictated to the courts what to do 
with paternity judgments "rendered months, years, or even decades earlier" 
despite the fact that such statute was in direct conflict with Rule 60(b).195 The 
court continued: 
Such a disregard for the traditional powers of the other branches of 
government is especially egregious in the context of parenting and 
parentage matters. The legislature has in effect ordered the courts to 
enter new judgments taking away the only father a child has ever 
known if a DNA test indicates that the father and child are not 
genetically linked. Such a legislative mandate overlooks how complex 
the parent-child relationship is. A person who has served as a parent 
for many years is still in many ways a parent to the child, no matter 
whose genes and chromosomes are involved. If this were not so, no 
adult could successfully adopt a child and raise the child to adulthood. 
The courts are in the best position to look out for the best interests of a 
child. The best interests are not automatically served by severing a parent-child 
relationship just because the parent and child were mistaken about their joint 
. h' 196 genetIc entage. 
193. § 3119.961 
Notwithstanding the provisions to the contrary in Civil Rule 60(B) and in accordance with 
this section, a person may file a motion for relief from a final judgment, court order, or 
administrative determination or order that determines that the person or a male minor ... is 
the father of a child .... 
(emphasis added). 
194. § 3119.967 ("[A] party is entitled to obtain relief under section 3119.962 of the Revised Code 
regardless of whether the judgment, order, or determination from which relief is sought was issued prior 
to, on, or after October 27,2000."). 
195. 784 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). 
196. Id. at 752. 
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The Sixth District Court of Appeals of Ohio, relying on Van Dusen, has 
similarly held that the Ohio statute is unconstitutional, contrary to the best 
interests of children, and violative of longstanding principle of res judicata. In 
Poskarbiewicz v. Poskarbiewicz, an ex-husband sought to vacate a paternity 
judgment almost fifteen years after the divorce proceedings. 197 He had 
unsuccessfully challenged paternity several times and, after the enactment of 
section 3119.962, provided genetic tests that disproved his biological paternity. 
The court determined that vacating the judgment would not be in the best 
interests of the child and, as noted above, declared the statute unconstitutional. 
Like the Van Dusen court, the Poskarbiewicz court focused on the need for 
stability in these actions, stating: "While we are mindful of the occasional 
situation in which an individual may be ordered to pay support for a genetically 
unrelated child, the need for stability and repose in child support and paternity 
actions far outweighs the hann of disturbing long-standing court orders.,,198 
Some statutes, however, attempt to strike a better balance between the 
rights of nonbiological fathers and children. Rather than permitting open-
ended paternity challenges, these statutes incorporate either a short statute of 
limitations within the paternity set-aside procedure and/or require courts to use 
discretion in reopening paternity and consider the best interests of the child. 
For example, Alaska's statute provides that the petitioner must file within 
three years of the child's birth or three years from the time that the petitioner 
knew or should have known that he might not be the child's biological 
father. 199 Because the statute allows a petitioner to file up to three years after 
he knew or should have known of his possible nonpaternity, this statute in effect 
provides no substantive limitation on the petitioner's ability to file for paternity 
disestablishment during the child's minority. If he does not learn of his 
nonpaternity until the child is fifteen, for example, he would still have three 
years to file his petition. No best interests of the child standard is included 
within the statute; thus, a child could consider a man her father for her entire 
minority, just to have that man legally disestablished as her father at her 
eighteenth birthday. Therefore, while the statute seemingly includes a short 
statute of limitations, it is too open-ended and does not serve to balance the 
.child's interests, unlike the time limitations included in the UPA and proposed 
in this Article. 
In contrast, the Minnesota statute contains a strict three-year time limit 
after the child's birth in which to challenge paternity if the man was married to 
or attempted to marry the child's mother.200 The three-year statute of 
197. 787 N.E.2d 688 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). 
198. Id. at 690. 
199. ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.166 (Michie 2002). 
200. MINN. STAT. § 257.57(b) (2003). The statute provides that for the purpose of declaring the 
nonexistence of the father and child relationship presumed under sections 257.55 (I)(a), (b), or (c), the 
action may be brought only within two years after the person bringing the action has reason to believe he 
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limitations similarly applies if new genetic testing reveals that the man 
previously presumed to be the father is not.201 A shorter statute of 
limitations-six months-applies if the man voluntarily acknowledged his 
parentage?02 The Minnesota statute, however, contains no statute of 
limitations for a challenge to paternity if paternity is presumed based upon the 
man having received the child into his home and openly holding the child out 
as his own.203 By not permitting too many open-ended challenges to paternity, 
this statute strikes a better balance for children, but is still deficient concerning 
the presumption of openly holding oneself out as the child's father. In such a 
circumstance, when a child has developed an emotional attachment and 
reliance on her father, permitting the father to challenge his paternity at any 
time without any consideration of the child's best interests could be 
devastating. 
None of the statutes discussed above provide satisfactory protection for a 
child's best interests. The statutes either fail to include a reasonable statute of 
limitations, thereby permitting a father to challenge paternity at almost any time 
until the child's majority, and/or omit the requirement that courts consider a 
child's best interests. Legislatures must place children's best interests as the 
paramount concern in the paternity fraud struggle and limit the means by which 
paternity can be disestablished. 
v. A PROPOSAL TO REDUCE PATERNITY FRAUD CLAIMS 
Current case law and statutes that permit paternity fraud actions often do 
not consider the best interests of the child. The legal trend of permitting 
paternity disestablishment is at odds with the trend of recognizing the legal 
rights of nonbiological parents who have actively cultivated parent-child 
relationships with their children. The trend toward recognition of functional 
is not the father, ''but in no event later than three years after the child's birth." ld. Section 257.55(1) 
includes presumptions of paternity that arise: 
(a) if the father and mother are or have been married to each other and the child is born 
during the marriage or within 280 days after the marriage is terminated; (b) if the father and 
mother attempted to marry each other prior to the child's birth and the child is born during 
attempted marriage or within 280 days of the attempted marriage's termination; or (c) after 
the child birth, the father and mother attempted to marry and although the marriage is invalid, 
the father has either acknowledged his paternity in writing, with his consent is named as the 
father on the child's birth certificate, or he is obligated to support the child under a written 
promise or court order. § 257.55(1). 
201. § 257.57(2)(3) (providing that for the purpose of declaring the nonexistence of the father and 
child relationship presumed under section 257.55(1)(f), the party has three years after obtaining the 
results of blood or genetic tests); ld. § 257.55(1)(f) (providing that a man is presumed to be the child's 
father ifblood or genetic testing establishes a statistical probability of paternity of99% or greater). 
202. § 257.57(2)(2). 
203. § 257.57(2)(1) (providing that a party can bring an action at any time to declare the 
nonexistence of a father and child relationship that is presumed under Minnesota Statute section 
257.55(d), which establishes a father and child relationship while the child is under the age ofmajoJity if 
the man receives the child into his home and openly holds the child out as his biological child). 
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parenthood places the best interests of the child at the forefront of the legal 
analysis. To preserve a child's right to have an adult remain in her life, courts 
now look beyond biology in recognizing the rights of parents by estoppel and 
de facto parents. Similarly, the best interests of the child should be paramount 
in the paternity fraud context. Even though the scenarios differ, in that the 
nonbiological father no longer wishes to have a legal and emotional 
relationship with his child, from the child's perspective there may be no 
appreciable difference. To the child, both types of individuals are a "parent." 
Recognizing, though, that there are circumstances in which the nonbiological 
father feels deceived by the fact of his legal parental relationship, I propose a 
short statute of limitations during which a man may challenge his paternity. 
The statute of limitations should be either 1) two years from the date on 
which a presumption of paternity, as defined by the UP A, applies to create a 
legal parental relationship204 or 2) two years from the date on which a legal 
paternity judgment is established in the absence of genetic marker or blood 
testing. Furthermore, even within the two-year time frames, a paternity 
disestablishment petition should be permitted only if it is in the child's best 
. 205 
mterest. 
204. See supra note 54 for the complete text of the Uniform Parentage Act, section 204, as 
amended in 2002. 
205. Note, too, that the UPA requires courts to consider a child's best interests when considering a 
motion for genetic testing. Section 608 of the Act incorporates principles of estoppel and provides 
courts with authority to deny motions for genetic testing, even within the two-year time limitations 
articulated above, if such testing would not be in the child's best interests. It provides, in part: 
(a) In a proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of a child having a presumed father or to 
challenge the paternity of a child having an acknowledged father, the court may deny a 
motion seeking an order for genetic testing of the mother, the child, and the presumed father 
or acknowledged father if the court determines that: 
(I) the conduct of the mother or the presumed or acknowledged father estops that party 
from denying parentage; and 
(2) it would be inequitable to disprove the father-child relationship between the child 
and the presumed or acknowledged father. 
(b) In determining whether to deny a motion seeking an order for genetic testing under this 
section, the court shall consider the best interest of the child . ... 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 608, 98 U.LA 26-27 (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). As noted in the 
Comment to section 608 of the Act, "In appropriate circumstances, the court may deny genetic testing 
and find the presumed or acknowledged father to be the father of the child." § 608 cmt. (2000). The 
Comment further notes that, "[b ]ecause § 607 places a two-year limitation on challenging the 
presumption of parentage, the application of this section should be applied in those meritorious cases in 
which the best interest of the child compels the result and the conduct of the mother and presumed or 
acknowledged father is clear." [d. 
In this way, the UP A blocks any attempts by the nonbiological father to disestablish paternity 
ifit is harmful to the child's best interests. Furthermore, this UPA provision provides support for a best 
interests consideration in the determination of whether to permit a petition for paternity 
disestablishment. 
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A. Precluding Petitions More than Two Years After a Presumption of 
Paternity Applies 
235 
Concerning the first portion of my proposed statute of limitations, UP A 
section 204 contains several presumptions of paternity, including 1) marriage to 
the child's mother and 2) residing with the child and holding himself out as the 
child's father. 206 Under UPA section 607, a presumption of paternity can be 
challenged only within two years, except in specific circumstances.207 Because 
the presumptions of paternity in UP A section 204 incorporate the marital 
presumption of paternity, my proposed statute of limitations would not permit 
an ex-husband to challenge paternity, unless he divorced his wife within two 
years of the child's birth and then sought to disprove paternity within the same 
two-year period. My reason for this strict time limitation is that the ex-husband 
has in almost all instances fostered a parent-child relationship with the child 
and has thus assumed a functional parental role even in the absence of 
biological parenthood. 
For example, in both the Godin and Doran cases discussed above, the 
father petitioned to disestablish paternity several years after the divorce. In 
Godin, Christina was fifteen years old when her father sought to disestablish 
paternity; not only had he engaged in a nurturing, functional parent-child 
relationship during the first eight years of her life while married to her mother, 
he continued to foster the relationship for six years following his divorce?08 
Similarly, in Doran, the father did not challenge paternity until several years 
after divorce, and he and the court agreed that he had fostered a loving parent-
child relationship with his son, Billy. 209 The Godin court did not permit 
paternity disestablishment, while the Doran court ruled that the father could 
disestablish paternity. Had either court been operating under the framework 
proposed above, neither father would have had standing to bring his case, since 
both men filed their petitions more than two years after fulfilling the parental 
presumption. 
Both courts noted the loving, caring relationships the fathers had 
established with their respective children. To permit either of these fathers the 
opportunity to question their paternity so far into the relationship does not serVe 
a child's best interests. As one court has noted in the context of a nonbiological 
father suing a child's mother for fraud, to allow the father's fraud claim 
focus[es] on the burdens of the parent-child relationship, while 
ignoring the benefits of the relationship .... Moreover, a ... claim that 
seeks to recover for the creation of a parent-child relationship has the 
206. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(4), 9B U.L.A. 14 (Supp. 2002). 
207. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607, 9B U.L.A. 25-26 (Supp. 2002). 
208. See supra notes 133-140 and accompanying text. 
209. See supra notes 171-179 and accompanying text. 
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effect of saying, 'I wish you had never been born' to a child who, 
before the revelation of biological fatherhood, was under the 
impression that he or she had a father who loved him or her.21O 
Permitting a man to disestablish an ongoing parental relationship tells the child 
that the father wishes he had never had a relationship with the child and that a 
lack of genetic connection takes precedence over the emotional bonds that they 
shared. 
Similarly, my proposed statute would preclude the petition in Williams. 
Even though Williams had less contact with his son than either Godin or Doran, 
he did visit with Marcus and held himself out as Marcus's father for se\'~ral 
years.211 While the court was concerned with fairness to Mr. Williams, it never 
discussed Marcus's best interests. In fact, this case debunks the Jezebel myth 
mentioned at the beginning of this Article. The mother in Williams was not 
engaged in outright deceit or trickery, but rather, did not know the identity of 
the actual biological father. In Williams, recall, the husband was declared the 
legal father. Even after he petitioned the court for an order to submit for 
genetic testing a man who he thought might be the biological father, that man, 
too, was not genetically related to Marcus. Thus, Williams' litigation rendered 
Marcus fatherless and without a paternal genetic identity. It is hard to advocate 
that this result was in Marcus's best interests. 
B. Precluding Petitions More than Two Years after Paternity Establishment 
The second part of my proposed statute of limitations would preclude a 
legal father from challenging a paternity judgment more than two years after its 
entry and would permit the challenge within the two-year time frame only if the 
court determined that the challenge was in the child's best interests. Unlike the 
first portion of my proposed statute of limitations, which will often operate as a 
strict two-year statute of limitations from the time of the child's birth, this 
second portion may give the acknowledged or adjudicated father more lime 
after the child's birth to challenge paternity. 
This second part of my proposed statute of limitations will also apply to 
nonmarital fathers who sign voluntary acknowledgments of parentage or who 
are adjudicated as fathers. These legal proceedings may not occur immediately 
following the child's birth. It is possible that the mother and child had no 
reliance on the nonmarital father until he was legally adjudicated as such. 
Thus, my proposal gives him two years from the time he is legally established 
as the child's father to file a petition to disestablish paternity if he realizes 
210. Day v. Heller, 653 N.W.2d 475, 479 (Neb. 2002) (rejecting former husband's claims against 
child's mother for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on wife's 
misrepresentation that that husband was the child's biological father). 
211. See supra notes 161-170 and accompanying text. 
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subsequent to the legal proceeding that he is not the biological father. Note, 
however, that if the legal father had lived with the child and held the child out 
as his own, a presumption of paternity would apply, and the strict two-year 
statute of limitations would be in effect.212 Moreover, by incorporating the best 
interest of the child standard, a court may still deny a man's petition to 
disestablish paternity-even if it is filed within two years from the date of 
paternity establishment-if such disestablishment action would not be in the 
best interest of the child.213 
For example, in In re Paternity of Cheryl, the father voluntarily 
acknowledged his paternity (without submitting to genetic marker testing) 
several months after Cheryl's birth?14 Thus, my proposal would have allowed 
him only two years after the entry of the judgment in which to challenge his 
paternity. If, for instance, he had not been legally established as Cheryl's father 
until one or two years after her birth, he would have had two years from the 
date of adjudication to challenge the paternity judgment. The inclusion of a 
best interests analysis allows the court to consider the effects a paternity 
disestablishment petition will have on the child. The Cheryl court considered 
the fact that the father had actively pursued a parent-child relationship with 
Cheryl. To sever the legal relationship-even if the father no longer wished to 
maintain his emotional bond-would have deprived Cheryl of a legal identity 
and legal and financial benefits. The court recognized that severing the 
relationship would be devastating to Cheryl. 
A two-year time limit, coupled with consideration of the child's best 
interests, would have changed the results in Langston v. Riffe and MA.S. v. 
Mississippi Department of Human Services. Recall in Langston, the court 
specifically rejected any consideration of the child's best interests and allowed 
paternity disestablishment petitions several years following paternity 
judgments, despite facts that, as in Cheryl, demonstrated a functional parent-
child relationship.2\S If the court had either employed a narrower statute of 
limitations or considered the child's best interests, the paternity 
disestablishment petitions would have been denied. 
C. Limiting Paternity Fraud Challenges: Protecting Children's Best Interests 
in a Manner Consistent with Modern Family Law Trends 
A two-year period in which to challenge legal fatherhood largely comports 
with the two-year statute of limitations to challenge paternity and/or 
212. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(5), 9B U.L.A. 14 (Supp. 2002). 
2\3. See supra note 205 for a discussion ofUPA section 608 and the application of the best interest 
of the child standard to a court's detennination whether to authorize genetic marker testing. A siJnilar 
analysis would apply here. 
214. See supra notes 118-\32 and accompanying text. 
215. See supra notes 149-153 and accompanying text. 
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presumptions of paternity contained within the UPA.216 Furthermore, the two-
year period is consistent with certain provisions within the ALI Principles for 
establishing a functional relationship with a child.217 Since functional or 
presumed parenthood can be established based upon a two-year period,218 it 
would be incongruous to disestablish paternity after an even greater length of 
time. Finally, by using a two-year statute of limitations in which to challenge 
legal paternity, the rights of a nonbiological father are recognized and 
preserved while ensuring that a child is not deprived of a parent after a 
significant bond has developed between the parties. 
Maintaining the legal parent-child relationship has support from both 
judges and scholars. One judge, addressing new reproductive technologies and 
its effects on family formations, has argued that estoppel is critical to achieving 
what is in the child's best interests, namely, preserving an intact parent-child 
relationship. Even though nonbiological fathers may allege that the child's 
mother fraudulently misrepresented that he was, in fact, the biological father, 
those allegations should have no bearing on the application of estoppel, because 
the father has assumed that functional, parental role, regardless of the genetic 
connection. Judge Tamilia wrote: 
As a matter of law and public policy, this type of fraud is vitiated by 
the acknowledgment of paternal responsibility. The variables of 
human nature, emotion and relationship are such th~t it is impossible to 
say six or seven years after acceptance, and when the relationship had 
soured, what would have been the appellant's reaction had he known 
the true identity of the biological father. With the wide range of 
activities engaged in today via artificial insemination, in vitro 
fertilization, surrogate parentage, and almost inconceivable matches 
resulting in children to parents who cannot conceive together, even this 
relationship might have been accepted by a husband who desired to 
preserve a marriage with a wife who desired to have a child which 
appellant could not produce. The state of confusion that exists in 
marital and nonmarital relationships in today's society requires that the 
fullest protection possible be provided to the children created through 
th I · hi 219 ese re atJons ps. 
216. VNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 307,308,607,98 V.LA. 317, 341 (2000). For the text of each 
section, see supra notes 102-104. 
217. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text. The ALI Principles look both to the time that 
the functional parent has lived with or fostered a parental relationship with the child as well as other 
factors which are detailed below. 
218. See, e.g., PRlNCIPLES, supra note 89, § 2.03(1)(b); VNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(5), 98 
V.L.A. 14 (Supp. 2002). 
219. Kohler v. 8leem, 654 A.2d 569, 580 (1995) (Tamilia, 1., dissenting). The majority determined 
that estoppel principles were inapplicable because the mother had misrepresented to ex-husband that he 
was child's father and that estoppel does not apply if one party has engaged in fraud; court thus 
permitted ex-husband's motion to vacate paternity order post divorce. Id. 
HeinOnline -- 16 Yale J.L. &. Feminism 239 2004
2004] When Daddy Doesn't Want to Be Daddy Anymore 239 
The statute of limitations that I have proposed will provide much more 
protection for children than the statutes analyzed in the previous section, by 
limiting the time in which a legal father can challenge his paternity and by 
requiring courts to consider the child's best interests. Thus, a child who has a 
functional parent-child relationship will not be at risk of losing the legal and 
financial benefits of that relationship (and, hopefully, too, the emotional 
benefits). 
D. Improved Paternity Establishment 
As discussed throughout this Article, many men are adjudicated legal 
fathers after participating in state paternity and child support enforcement 
systems. As several courts noted, forcing women to "name names" so that she 
can qualify for needed fmancial assistance may result in the wrong name being 
given and an erroneous judgment entered.220 Greater efforts to serve named 
defendants to avoid default judgments would greatly ameliorate the instances of 
paternity fraud. Moreover, requiring genetic testing in the paternity context 
would further reduce the number of paternity fraud cases. As Professors Cahn 
and Carbone suggest, mandatory paternity testing would estop paternity 
challenges.221 And, if someone refuses to submit to testing or voluntarily 
chooses to acknowledge paternity despite a genetic test which reveals 
nonpaternity, then he should not later be able to bring a paternity challenge. 
While this does not assist married men who may not know to question their 
wives' fidelity, it would reduce the incidence of paternity fraud. Moreover, as 
argued above, the marital context often differs from the paternity context in that 
the married nonbiological father has often nurtured a longstanding emotional 
and functional relationship with his child.222 
CONCLUSION: IF THE GENES DON'T FIT, YOU'RE STILL THE FATHER 
Genetic connection is but one of a myriad of elements that defme 
parentage. More families are being created without two-parent genetic 
connections to the child. As we move toward a more comprehensive definition 
of family, we should not sever existing family units because of a lack of 
biological connection between a parent and child. By so doing, courts ignore 
both the best interests of children and the larger social value of including 
multiple types of families. 
220. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. 
221. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
222. For example, the fathers in Godin and Doran had actively parented their children for fifteen 
years and six years, respectively, prior to seeking paternity disestablishment. See supra notes 133 and 
171. 
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In trying to balance the best interests of fathers and children, however, the 
balance seems best struck when a short statute of limitations, coupled with a 
best interests analysis requirement, is used. A two-year statute of limitations 
from the triggering of a presumption of parenthood or the legal establishment 
of paternity by acknowledgment or judgment provides the father with an 
opportunity to challenge a paternity judgment, without causing too much 
disruption to the child. If the man does not challenge his paternity within two 
years of its establishment by presumption of judgment he should not be able to 
bring an action to disestablish his paternity years later. Even though it may 
seem unfair to the father-that he is "supporting another man's child"-he is, 
in fact, supporting his own. Years of functioning as a parent should not be 
dismissed as a "favor" to the mother and child. A legal-and often 
emotional-parent-child relationship was formed, despite the lack of biological 
connection between the father and child. Open-ended paternity challenges are 
not fair to children and often do not accurately reflect the parenting role the 
father played. Furthermore, open-ended paternity challenges do not accurately 
reflect modern family trends and the importance of functional parenthood and 
serve as a backlash against functional parenthood. Functioning as a parent 
should be held superior to mere biological parenthood. 
